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This paper studies the price-setting problem of a monopoly that in each time pe-
riod has the option of failing to deliver its good after receiving payment. The
monopoly may be induced to deliver the good if consumers expect that the
monopoly will not deliver in the future if it does not deliver today. If the good is
nondurableandconsumersareanonymous,themonopoly’soptimalstrategyisto
set a price equal to the static monopoly price each period if the discount factor is
highenough,andotherwisetosetthelowestpriceatwhichitcancrediblypromise
to deliver the good. If the good is durable, we derive an intuitive lower bound on
the monopoly’s optimal proﬁt for any discount factor and show that it converges
totheoptimalstaticmonopolyproﬁtasthediscountfactorconvergesto1,incon-
trast to the Coase conjecture. We also show that rationing the good is never opti-
mal for the monopoly if there is an efﬁcient resale market and that the best equi-
librium in which the monopoly always delivers involves a strictly decreasing price
path that asymptotes to a level strictly above the ratio of the monopoly’s marginal
cost to the discount factor.
Keywords. Coase conjecture, durable goods, monopoly pricing, nondurable
goods, rationing, relational incentives.
JEL classification. C70, D42, L12.
1. Introduction
The possibility of trade is often threatened by the possibility of opportunism. For ex-
ample, a consumer who purchases a good from an online retailer must trust that the
good will actually be delivered—as taking legal action in the case of nondelivery would
be very costly—and must also believe that the retailer is not about to cut its price dra-
matically. Fortunately, long term incentives can mitigate the risk of opportunistic be-
havior: in the above example, the retailer may both deliver the good and keep prices
high to preserve its standing with its consumers, even if it has no fear of the legal conse-
quences of nondelivery. In particular, either failing to deliver the good or cutting prices
may lead consumers to believe that the ﬁrm will not deliver the good in the future, as
either of these actions could be interpreted as an indication that the ﬁrm is trying to
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maximize its short run proﬁts and then quit the market.1 This reasoning suggests that a
seller who is tempted to fail to deliver her product may still do quite well if the future is
sufﬁciently important. This paper studies this idea in the context of both nondurable-
and durable-goods monopoly, focusing primarily on the more involved durable-goods
case.
The above intuition contrasts starkly with the Coase conjecture (Coase 1972)t h a ta
patient durable-goods seller who cannot commit to future prices earns little proﬁt. As
we will see, the Coase conjecture relies on the assumption that the seller is committed
to delivering the good at her quoted price. In particular, the Coasian temptation to cut
prices is absent when a price cut leads to a continuation equilibrium in which no con-
sumersmakepurchases(expectingnondelivery)andthesellerneverdelivers(expecting
no future purchases).2 Thus, even if the seller cannot commit to a price path, she can
still earn high proﬁts if she is not committed to delivering the good either.3 This sug-
gests that the Coase conjecture may not apply to any institutional setting: If the seller
can legally commit herself to both a price path and delivery of the good, she should
do so. If she can legally commit herself to delivery, but not to a price path, she should
not.4,5
Throughout, we consider an inﬁnitely repeated interaction between a monopoly
seller and a continuum of buyers, where, in every period, the seller ﬁrst sets a price,
consumers then choose whether to pay, and ﬁnally the seller chooses whether to deliver
the good to each consumer. All actions are perfectly observable. If the good is non-
durable and consumers are anonymous, we completely characterize the optimal per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium of this game for the seller: if the seller is sufﬁciently patient,
she sets the static monopoly price each period and delivers the good to all consumers
who purchase, while if she is less patient, she charges a higher price so as to reduce the
quantity demanded and thereby reduce her temptation to fail to deliver.6
1An alternative story, which we discuss below, is that the retailer is contractually obligated to deliver
something, but that the quality of the good it delivers is unveriﬁable. In this case, it is natural to think that a
price cut may suggest to consumers that the retailer intends to deliver a low-quality good. For an example
ofanonlinemarketinwhichlower-pricedgoodsseemtobeofextremelylowquality,seeEllisonandEllison
(2009).
2Of course, the seller now has an incentive to fail to deliver the good, so the result that the seller can earn
high proﬁts is not trivial.
3This reasoning is similar to Bernheim and Whinston’s (1998) point that if some aspects of behavior are
noncontractible, it is often optimal to fail to contract on other aspects as well.
4This is a slight oversimpliﬁcation, as there will be many equilibria in our model, not all of which yield
high proﬁts. For example, if consumers believe that the monopoly will never deliver the good unless it
legally commits itself to do so, then of course so committing is the right move. Alternatively, the dynamic
contracting literature often uses proﬁt maximization as an equilibrium reﬁnement and it does not seem
more unreasonable than usual to do so here.
5In some environments, the seller may be automatically committed to delivering the good, for example,
if nondelivery is viewed by courts as breaching an implicit contract. To address this issue, in Section 7
we show that our results extend to a setting, where, in each period, the seller has an exogenous chance of
being unable to deliver the good. We feel that in such a setting the issue that nondelivery may be viewed as
breaching an implicit contract does not arise, since nondelivery always occurs occasionally.
6Theﬁrstpartofthisstatementalsoholdswhenconsumersarenonanonymous,incontrasttotheresults
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When the good is durable, the structure of any equilibrium in which the seller de-
livers the good is complicated: sales must continue forever, since the seller would never
deliver the good to the last consumer, and the price path must fall slowly enough that
consumers do not always wait for lower prices but quickly enough that sales do not oc-
cur so rapidly that the seller gives in to her temptation to fail to deliver. Indeed, with a
general distribution of consumer valuations, it is very difﬁcult to construct any equilib-
riainwhichtheselleralwaysdeliversthegood.7 We,therefore,takeanindirectapproach
to analyzing this model by ﬁrst considering an auxiliary model where the seller has the
ability to set a maximum sales quantity each period in addition to the price, thereby ra-
tioning the good. Our main result in this model with rationing, which we see as being
of some independent interest, is that using rationing is never optimal for the seller. We
then show that the seller’s optimal proﬁt in the original model must exceed her proﬁt in
any equilibrium involving rationing.
Thisobservationallowsustoderivealowerboundontheseller’sproﬁtintheoriginal
model—where constructing equilibria is very difﬁcult—by constructing simple equilib-
ria in the model with rationing. In particular, we construct equilibria in which price
is constant over time but quantity sold every period is restricted via rationing. These
quantity restrictions lead to positive residual demand, which gives the seller a reason to
deliver the good. We show that a patient seller can approximate her static optimal proﬁt
levelbysettingpriceequaltothestaticmonopolypriceeveryperiodandsellingtothose
consumers who are willing to buy at this price at a constant rate. Furthermore, for any
discount factor δ, the seller’s optimal proﬁt is at least as high as the static monopoly
proﬁt of a seller with cost of delivering the good equal to c/δ,w h e r ec is the cost of de-
livering the good in the dynamic model, as this is precisely the proﬁt level that can be
attained by setting the price equal to the static monopoly price of a seller with cost c/δ
and then selling (at cost c) at the fastest rate at which the seller is willing to deliver in the
dynamic model. We also use the relationship between our model and the model with
rationing to show that the best equilibria for the seller, in which she delivers the good to
all consumers who purchase, involve a strictly declining price path that asymptotes to a
price no lower than c/δ.
We proceed as follows: Section 2 relates this paper to the literatures on the Coase
conjecture,strategicrationing, andrelationalcontracting. Section 3 introducesourgen-
eralmodelofbothdurable-andnondurable-goodsmonopolywithrelationalincentives.
Section 4 analyzes the model in the simpler case of a nondurable-goods monopoly. It is
included both for completeness and because of connections between it and the sub-
sequent analysis of the durable-goods model. Section 5 introduces the model with a
durable-goods monopoly, as well as the model with rationing, and studies the connec-
tion between the two, ultimately showing that the best equilibrium without on-path
nondelivery for the seller in the model without rationing yields proﬁt at least as high as
thatinanyequilibriumwithouton-pathnondeliveryinthemodelwithrationing. Build-
ing off this insight, Section 6 presents our main results on the durable-goods model:
7Asdiscussedbelow,itismucheasiertoconstructequilibriainwhichthesellersometimesfailstodeliver
the good, but these equilibria may be unappealing for other reasons.482 Alexander Wolitzky Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
proﬁtsareboundedfrombelowbythoseofastaticmonopolywithcost c/δ,an dthebes t
equilibrium price path along which the seller always delivers strictly declines over time
and asymptotes to at least c/δ. Section 7 extends our analysis to a setting in which the
sellerissometimes(exogenously)unabletodeliverthegood,whereourassumptionthat
the seller has the option of nondelivery seems particularly appropriate. Section 8 con-
cludesand discussessomeapplicationsand empirical predictionsofourmodel. Several
proofs are deferred to Appendix A,a n dAppendix B discusses equilibria in which the
seller does not always deliver the good along the equilibrium path.
2. Relation to the literature
As indicated above, our results stand in stark contrast to the Coase conjecture (Coase
1972), which was formalized and explored by Stokey (1982), Bulow (1982), Fudenberg
et al. (1985), and Gul et al. (1986).8,9 Our model would coincide with the standard
“no-commitment” durable-goods monopoly model if the seller, while still lacking com-
mitment power over prices, was committed to delivering the good to all consumers
who purchase. In this sense, our model has less commitment than this standard no-
commitment case, although of course the reason the seller does better in our model is
notthatithaslesscommitmentpower,butratherthatcommittingtodeliveringthegood
to all consumers who purchase may not be wise, as after making such a commitment,
the seller is tempted to cut prices.
The literature on the Coase conjecture draws a sharp distinction between the “gap
case” in which the lowest consumer valuation is strictly greater than the seller’s mar-
ginal cost and the alternative “no-gap case.” In the gap case, Fudenberg et al. (1985)a n d
Gul et al. (1986) show that there is generically a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
which is Markovian and satisﬁes the Coase conjecture. In the no-gap case, a seminal
paper by Ausubel and Deneckere (1989) constructs non-Markovian equilibria that yield
static monopoly proﬁts as the discount factor approaches 1. The reason for the differ-
ence between the cases is that in the gap case, the seller is always tempted to cut prices
to the lowest consumer valuation, which allows the problem to be solved by backward
induction, while in the no-gap case, the possibility that the price may fall to marginal
cost very quickly if the seller deviates from a prescribed price path allows the seller to
8Some of the many inﬂuential papers in the subsequent literature, in addition to those discussed in the
text, are Ausubel and Deneckere (1987) and Gul (1987) on durable-goods oligopoly; Sobel (1991)o nt h e
entry of new consumers; Bagnoli et al. (1989) on ﬁnite populations; Bond and Samuelson (1987), Karp
(1996), and Deneckere and Liang (2008) on depreciation; Kahn (1986) and McAfee and Wiseman (2008)
on capacity constraints; Olsen (1992) on learning-by-doing in production; Cabral et al. (1999) and Mason
(2000) on network externalities; Dudine et al. (2006) on storable goods; Deneckere and Liang (2006) and
Hörner and Vieille (2009) on interdependent values; Biehl (2001) on changing consumer valuations; and
Board (2008) on time-varying demand. There is also a large literature on durable-goods monopoly with
bilateral offers, the early part of which is surveyed in Section 10.4 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
9In traditional Coase conjecture papers, like Fudenberg et al. (1985), Gul et al. (1986), and Ausubel and
Deneckere (1989), themodel may be interpretedasa monopoly selling toeithera continuum of consumers
with a known distribution of valuations or to a single consumer with unknown valuation. In the current
paper, only the ﬁrst interpretation is applicable, as in the single-buyer case, the monopoly would never
deliver the good after the buyer purchased, so there would be no equilibrium in which trade occurs.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Dynamic monopoly with relational incentives 483
maintain high prices in equilibrium. This distinction between the gap and no-gap cases
does not arise in our model, since in our model the off-path expectation that prevents
the seller from cutting prices is that the seller will not deliver the good, not that the
seller will rapidly cut prices. Our analysis of durable-goods monopoly does more than
show that the possibility of nondelivery allows Ausubel and Deneckere-style equilibria
to be constructed in the gap case; however, as indicated above, we also provide a nat-
ural lower bound on seller payoffs for a ﬁxed discount factor δ and prove that, for any δ,
the best equilibrium for the seller in which there is no nondelivery has declining prices
converging to a price no lower than c/δ. Results for ﬁxed δ and characterizations of
optimal equilibria are rare in the durable-goods monopoly literature. For example, for
δ bounded away from 1, none of the early papers on the Coase conjecture cited above
contains results about optimal seller proﬁts or the asymptotic behavior of the optimal
price path.
Becauseourapproachreliesoncomparingourmodeltoanauxiliarymodelinwhich
the seller is able to ration the good, our paper connects to the literature on strategic ra-
tioning. One lesson from this literature is that rationing in the absence of an efﬁcient re-
sale market, i.e., when the highest-valuation consumers do not always receive the good
when there is a shortage, can help the seller both when she can commit to a price path
(Van Cayseele 1991) and when she cannot (Denicolò and Garella 1999). Both Van Cay-
seele and Denicolò and Garella consider short ﬁnite horizons and state that rationing
in the presence of an efﬁcient resale market is never optimal. As part of our analysis of
the durable-goodsmodel, we show that this result holds in an inﬁnite-horizon setting.10
Our focus is very different from that of Van Cayseele and Denicolò and Garella, as they
are interested primarily in cases where allowing rationing can increase proﬁts, while we
areinterestedpreciselyincaseswhereallowingrationingcannotincreaseproﬁts,sothat
wecanusethemodelwithrationingtoderiveresultsaboutthemodelwithoutrationing.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on relational contracting, particularly
that part of the relational contracting literature that studies durable goods with hidden
quality, whichoriginated with thefamous papersof Klein and Lefﬂer (1981)andShapiro
(1982, 1983).11 While traditional models of durable-goods monopoly can be thought of
as “relational,” in that they study the effect of dynamic incentives on a seller’s decision
to cut prices, we go further and assume that dynamic incentives also govern the seller’s
decision to deliver the good. Thus, the difference between our model and the existing
literature on the dynamic seller is that we move a decision—delivery—from formal to
relational enforcement. Also, the equilibria we construct induce cooperation through
the Nash threat of breaking off trade, as in many relational contracting models (e.g., Bull
1987, Levin 2003). Indeed, a key difference between our model and traditional models
of dynamic monopoly is that our model admits a Nash equilibrium in which the seller
receives her minmax value.
10The relevant result (Proposition 4) assumes that the seller has the option of failing to deliver the good,
but the proof shows that the result continues to hold when the seller does not have this option.
11For an up-to-date survey of this rapidly expanding literature, see Malcomson (forthcoming). For a
recent contribution with some similarities to the current paper, see Masten and Kosová (2009).484 Alexander Wolitzky Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
3. Model
Throughout, we consider a seller who can provide a good at marginal cost c>0 facing
a continuum of consumers of mass 1 with valuations (per period in the case of non-
durables; net present valuein thecaseof durables) v ∼ F(v)with boundedsupport [v v]
withv ≥ 0, v>c,andF continuouslydifferentiablewithstrictlypositivedensity f.T h e r e
is a continuum of consumers with each valuation in [v v], so that if a random fraction x
of consumers receive the good in some period, then that fraction x of consumers with
every valuation receive the good. We do not make any assumptions as to whether v is
g r e a t e rt h a no rl e s st h a nc, i.e., as to whether we are in the gap or no-gap case. Let pm
be the static monopoly price of a seller facing consumers with valuations v ∼ F(v)and
marginal cost c.
The traditional no-commitment model of dynamic monopoly is the following inﬁ-
nitely repeated game:
1. At time t ∈{ 0 1    }, the seller chooses a menu of price–delivery probability pairs
{(pt n xt n)}n.
2. Every consumer either selects a price–delivery probability pair (pt n xt n) ∈{ (pt n 
xt n)}n or rejects. Consumers who select (pt n xt n) pay pt n and receive the good
with probability xt n. The seller gets payoff pt n − c from each consumer who pays
pt n and receives the good, and gets pt n from each consumer who pays pt n and
does not receive the good. A consumer with valuation v who pays pt n gets payoff
v − pt n if he receives the good and gets payoff −pt n if he does not receive the
good.
3. Repeat 1 and 2, discounting by (common) discount factor δ.
In our model, the seller has the option of nondelivery. The game becomes the fol-
lowing:
1. At time t ∈{ 0 1    }, the seller chooses a menu of prices {pt n}n.
2. Every consumer either selects a price pt n ∈{ pt n}n or rejects. Consumers who se-
lect pt n pay pt n.L e tQt n be the mass of consumers who pay pt n.
3. For each pt n, the seller chooses what fraction xt n ∈[ 0 1] of those Qt n consumers
who pay pt n receive the good. Each consumer who pays pt n receives the good
with probability xt n. Payoffs are as above.
4. Repeat 1 and 3, discounting by δ.
Weassumethatplayersusestrategies thatdependonconsumers’decisionsattime t
only through Qt n. This entails assuming that the seller does not condition her strat-
egy on play by measure-zero sets of consumers, as is standard in the durable-goods
monopolyliterature,aswellasthatconsumersareanonymous.12 Inparticular,theseller
12See the discussion following Proposition 1 for more on this point.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Dynamic monopoly with relational incentives 485
cannot discriminate among consumers on the basis of their past play in either her pric-
ing or delivery decisions.
Crucially, we assume that all decisions of the seller are publicly observed. Formally,
let the history ht at the start of period t be
({p0 n} {Q0 n} {x0 n}     {pt−1 n} {Qt−1 n} {xt−1 n}) 
Each of the seller’s (pure) strategies is a pair of maps from histories ht to {pt n},w h e r e
pt n ∈[ 0 ∞) for all t, n, and from histories (ht {pt n} {Qt n}) to xt n ∈[ 0 1] for all Qt n,
while a consumer’s (pure) strategy is a map from histories (ht {pt n}) to {{pt n} ∅},c o r -
responding to accepting a price pt n or rejecting. Note that, for any strategy proﬁle,
changing the strategy of a single consumer does not affect the probability distribution
over histories ht for any t; that is, a deviation by a single consumer does not affect the
path of play.
Throughout, our solution concept is pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibrium,
which we simply abbreviate PBE. Of course, the assumption that the seller uses a pure
strategy does not imply that she chooses xt n ∈{ 0 1}, but rather than she does not ran-
domize over different choices of {pt n} or {xt n}. We have not explored whether mixed
strategy equilibria can differ substantially from pure strategy equilibria; however, our
mainresultsthatthesellercanearnhighproﬁtsinequilibriumcanonlybestrengthened
by considering mixed strategy equilibria.
Weobserveimmediatelythatineitherthenondurable-orthedurable-goodsversion
of our model there is a Nash equilibrium in which consumers reject all price offers and
the seller sets xt n = 0 for all t, n. The threat of reversion to this equilibrium following
any deviation may induce the seller to conform to a prescribed price path as well as to
deliver the good to those consumers who purchase. No such Nash equilibrium exists in
the traditional no-commitment model.
We make frequent use of the following deﬁnition.




at least a low-quality good (at cost normalized to zero) to any consumer who purchases
and is able to deliver a high-quality good at additional cost c, and that quality is non-
contractable. If every consumer has valuation zero for the low-quality good, our model
is unchanged, with “low-quality delivery” substituted for “nondelivery.” This interpre-
tation depends on every consumer having valuation zero for the low-quality good, and
thus may be most attractive when quality is extremely difﬁcult to verify. For example,
the good may be a complicated, high-tech upgrade of an existing piece of hardware or
softwarethathasnovalueatallforconsumersifit isnotsuperior totheoriginal product486 Alexander Wolitzky Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
and that outside observers are unable to verify whether the upgrade is, in fact, better
than the original.13
4. Nondurable-goods monopoly
In this section, each consumer demands one unit of the good each period, and v
is a consumer’s per-period valuation. We also assume, for this section only, that
v −(1−F(v))/f(v) is weakly increasing, so that in the static monopoly allocation, every
consumer with positive virtual surplus receives the good.14
Ourmainresultinthissectionisthat,intheoptimalequilibrium,15 thesellersetsthe
(single) price equal to the static monopoly price if she is sufﬁciently patient, and other-
wise sets the lowest price at which she is willing to deliver the good. The intuition is that
the seller’s incentive to fail to deliver the good is increasing in quantity, so if the seller is
impatient, she must restrict quantity to credibly commit to delivery, and the most prof-
itable way to do this is to increase price. In particular, the seller sets p = max{pm c/δ}
everyperiod. Toseewhyc/δisthelowestpriceatwhichtheselleriswillingtodeliverthe
good, let D(p) ≡ 1−F(p)be demand at price p, and note that in every period the seller
gains cD(p) from failing to deliver and gains (δ/(1−δ))(p − c)D(p) from delivering.
The latter is weakly greater than the former if and only if p ≥ c/δ. The idea of the proof
is to ﬁrst note that the seller can in effect commit to any price path, since deviations
in price-setting may lead consumers to believe that the seller will not deliver the good
and thus lead to zero sales. Next observe that the best dynamic sales mechanism for the
seller is stationary, as increasing one period’s proﬁts also relaxes the seller’s incentive
compatibility (willingness to deliver) constraints from earlier periods. Finally, use stan-
dard static mechanism techniques to characterize the optimal stationary mechanism
that is incentive compatible for the seller. The proof is deferred to Appendix A.
Proposition 1. If v ≥ c/δ, the equilibrium path of the optimal PBE of the nondurable-
goods model is given by pt n = max{pm c/δ} for all t, n, buyers accept if and only if
v ≥ pt n, and the seller delivers the good with probability 1 to all buyers who accept each
period. That is, the seller offers only a posted price p in every period, p = pm if δ ≥ c/pm
and p = c/δ>pm if δ<c / p m.I fv<c/ δ , there is no PBE in which the seller ever delivers
the good or receives positive payments.
13Our results do not apply if consumers have positive valuations for the low-quality good, since in this
case the model need not have a Nash equilibrium that yields zero proﬁt. However, two recent papers illus-
trate interesting phenomena that may occur in such settings. Inderst (2008) shows that a durable-goods
monopoly that sells low- and high-quality goods may serve the entire market in the ﬁrst period, selling the
low-quality good to low-valuation consumers as a means of committing itself not to subsequently offer the
high-qualitygoodatalowerprice. Hahn (2006)showsthatthislogicmayprovideanincentiveforadurable-
goods monopoly to introduce a damaged version of its good and argues that this often has negative welfare
consequences.
14This assumption is for technical convenience only.
15The proof of Proposition 1 shows existence and uniqueness of an optimal equilibrium.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Dynamic monopoly with relational incentives 487
Recall that we have assumed that buyers are anonymous. Nonetheless, it is not hard
to construct equilibria that yield static monopoly proﬁts even if buyers are nonanony-
mous, provided that δ ≥ c/pm. For example, let the seller set p = pm in every pe-
riod, and deliver the good if and only if she has both always delivered the good to all
consumers who have purchased and set p = pm in the past, and let each consumer
purchase the good every period if and only if her valuation exceeds pm and the seller
has always delivered the good to all consumers who have purchased and has always
set p = pm. In every period, the seller gains cD(pm) from failing to deliver and gains
(δ/(1−δ))(pm − c)D(pm) from delivering, so the seller will deliver if δ ≥ c/pm.T h i sr e -
sult differs dramatically from the classic analysis of nondurable-goods monopoly with
nonanonymous consumers provided by Hart and Tirole (1988). Hart and Tirole show
that, in a ﬁnite-horizon model with nondurable goods and nonanonymous consumers,
equilibrium is governed by the ratchet effect: in every PBE, if v >c ,t h e npt = v for all
but the last few periods. Technically, the difference between our result and theirs comes
from the fact that the stage game in our model has a bad Nash equilibrium (reject any
offer, never deliver), which can be used as an off-equilibrium threat to prevent the seller
from using information revealed early on against high-valuation buyers.16 The key eco-
nomic point is that the usual repeated game trade-off between a short term gain from
cheating and a long term gain from cooperation on the part of the seller is absent in
the Hart–Tirole model: in their model, the seller is free to “cheat” by raising the price
she charges to buyers that reveal themselves to have high valuations, but buyers can-
not credibly retaliate by refusing to buy at the higher price. In our model, the option
of the seller to fail to deliver the good lets the buyer credibly punish the seller for rais-
ing the price, allowing the seller to commit to keeping the price constant. Alternatively,
we must now keep track of the seller’s incentive to deliver the good. If δ ≥ c/pm,t h i s
incentive constraint is slack, so the seller can attain her full-commitment optimum.
5. Durable-goods monopoly and rationing
5.1 Preliminaries
For the remainder of the paper, each consumer demands only one unit of the (durable)
good, and v is a consumer’s net present value of receiving the good. In the traditional
model of this situation (see Section 3), Fudenberg et al. (1985)a n dGul et al. (1986)s h o w
that the Coase conjecture applies if the lowest valuation v is greater than c:f o rg e n e r i c
parameters, there is a unique PBE, and as δ goes to 1, the seller’s proﬁt goes to v −c and
the price drops to v very quickly.
OurmainresultimpliesthattheCoaseconjecturedoesnotapplytothismodelwhen
the seller has the option of nondelivery (see Section 3), which we call the relational con-
tracting model or  . Much of our analysis focuses on a particular class of PBE, which
we call full-delivery PBE. A full-delivery PBE is a PBE in which the seller sets xt n = 1
16Theinﬁnite-horizonversionoftheHart–Tirolemodelhasequilibriathatyieldsellerproﬁtsabove v−c,
though how much above v − c has to our knowledge not been studied in the literature. Thus, it is possible
that some of the difference in results is due to the difference in time horizons.488 Alexander Wolitzky Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
for all n at all histories on the equilibrium path. It is important to note that the seller
may set xt n < 1 off the equilibrium path in a full-delivery PBE. A full-delivery PBE is
a best full-delivery PBE if there is no other full-delivery PBE that yields strictly higher
payoff for the seller—we use the word “optimal” for the best PBE overall and “best” for
the best full-delivery PBE to help avoid confusion. Note that on the equilibrium path
of a full-delivery PBE there is no reason for the seller to offer a menu of prices, as each
consumer will either accept the lowest offered price or reject, so we simplify notation
by writing pt for the lowest price offered by the seller at time t on the equilibrium path.
Furthermore, a consumer who pays pt always receives the good at time t; we say that a
consumer who pays pt at time t on the equilibrium path of a full-deliveryPBE purchases
the good at time t. Since we have restricted attention to pure strategy equilibria, every
consumer purchases at exactly one time in every full-delivery PBE, with the convention
that a consumer who never receives the good purchases at t =∞.
Clearly, an optimal PBE of the relational contracting model can yield no higher pay-
off to the seller than an optimal PBE of the full-commitment model in which the re-
quirement that the seller’s strategy is sequentially rational is relaxed, and it follows from
standard results that an optimal PBE of this full-commitment model yields proﬁts equal
to optimal static monopoly proﬁts. Our main result is the following theorem, which im-
plies that the Coase conjecture does not hold in this game regardless of the relationship
between v and c, and also provides a lower bound on the seller’s proﬁt for any ﬁxed δ.
Theorem 1. In the relational contracting model, the following statements hold.
(i) An optimal PBE exists.
(ii) A best full-delivery PBE exists.
(iii) As δ approaches 1, proﬁt in a best full-delivery PBE approaches static monopoly
proﬁt.
(iv) Ifv>c/ δandcostequalsc,thereexistsafull-deliveryPBEinwhichproﬁtisstrictly
greater than static monopoly proﬁt when cost equals c/δ.
(v) If v>c / δ , any best full-delivery PBE has a strictly decreasing price path and in-
volves positive sales in every period.
(vi) If v>c/ δ , pt ≥ max{v c/δ} for all t in any best full-delivery PBE.
(vii) If v ≤ c/δ, there is no PBE in which the seller ever delivers the good or receives
positive payments.
Sections5and6weredevotedtoestablishingTheorem1: parts(i)and(ii) areproved
in this section (in Propositions 2 and 5) and parts (iii)–(vii) are proved in Section 6 (in
Propositions 6–9). We therefore take a moment to motivate devoting so much attention
to full-delivery PBE. Full-delivery PBE are those equilibria in which on-path delivery
is as in both the full-commitment model (in which the seller commits to both a price
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in Section 3, which makes them a natural class of equilibria to study. Indeed, on-path
nondelivery—the equivalent of the seller selling lottery tickets that entitle consumers to
receive the good with some probability less than 1—may be unappealing in some set-
tings, for example, if consumers can tell whether the seller has failed to deliver the good
to anyone but not whether the seller has delivered to some exact fraction of consumers.
Furthermore, Theorem 1 implies that the proﬁt lost by the seller in a best full-delivery
PBE as opposed to an optimal PBE is bounded from above by the difference between
static monopoly proﬁt when cost equals c and when cost equals c/δ,w h i c hi ss m a l lf o rδ
close to 1. Nonetheless, we conjecture that, in general, the optimal PBE is not full de-
livery, for reasons we discuss in Appendix B. Appendix B proves the analogues of parts
(iii) and (iv) of Theorem 1 for non-full-delivery equilibria directly, i.e., without relying
on the connection between the relational contracting model and the related model with
rationing introduced below. The approach of Appendix B also has the advantage of ex-
plicitly constructing equilibria in the relational contracting model, while the approach
taken in the body of the paper is nonconstructive. Thus, there are at least two very dif-
ferent kinds of PBE that yield high seller proﬁts: full-delivery PBE with declining price
paths, whose existence is proven nonconstructively in the text, and non-full-delivery
equilibria with constant price paths, which are constructed in Appendix B.
We adopt a novel approach to proving Theorem 1. We ﬁrst introduce the following
variant of the relational contracting model, in which the seller can artiﬁcially restrict the
quantity of the good supplied each period.
1. The seller chooses a price pt and a maximum quantity to supply qt ∈[ 0 1].17
2. Every consumer chooses whether or not to accept pt.I fl e s st h a nqt consumers ac-
cept, all consumers who accept pay pt.O t h e r w i s e ,t h eqt consumer with the high-
est valuation among those who accept pay pt. Formally, a consumer with valua-
tion v who accepts pays if and only if the mass of consumers with valuation strictly
greater than v who accept is strictly less than qt.
3. If measure Qt of consumers pay pt (which we call the period t quantity), the seller
chooses what fraction xt ∈[ 0 1] of these consumers receive the good. Each con-
sumer who pays pt receives the good with probability xt.
4. Repeat 1 and 3, discounting by δ.
Wehavenotallowedthesellertooffermenusofprices,asthiswouldonlycomplicate
notation, since we restrict attention to full-delivery PBE in what follows.
We call this game the relational contracting model with rationing, or simply the
model with rationing, or  R.18 Optimal, full-delivery, and best full-delivery PBE in  R
17For the remainder of the paper, qt refers to the quantity cap in period t and Qt refers to the number of
consumers who pay in period t (i.e., the period t quantity). By construction of the model with rationing,
Qt ≤ qt.
18In deﬁning  R we have made two assumptions on the rationing technology: that types on the bound-
ary between receiving the good and not do not receive the good, and that any rationing that occurs is “ef-
ﬁcient” in that the highest-valuation consumers are eligible to receive the good. The ﬁrst assumption is490 Alexander Wolitzky Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
aredeﬁnedasin . Themainreasonweintroduce R isthatfull-deliveryequilibriain R
may have ﬂat price paths, while every full-delivery equilibrium in   must involve price
cuts, as otherwise there would be no way to delay sales and thereby induce delivery.19
Full-delivery equilibria with ﬂat price paths are easy to analyze, as consumers’ incen-
tives in such equilibria are trivial: if theprice is ﬁxed at p in a full-deliveryequilibrium, a
consumer with valuation v ≥ p wants to purchase as soon as possible, while a consumer
with v<pwill never purchase. We will show that full-delivery equilibria with ﬂat price
paths exist in  R that approximate static monopoly proﬁts for high δ. Furthermore, we
will show that a price–quantity path (p Q)t is a best full-delivery PBE price–quantity
path in   if and only if it is a best full-delivery PBE price–quantity path in  R (Corollary 1
in Section 5.4). Therefore, the best full-delivery PBE proﬁt attainable by the seller is the
same in   and  R, so the above observation that simple full-delivery PBE exist in  R in
which proﬁts approximate static optimal proﬁts immediately yields part (iii) of Theo-
rem 1, even though no such simple full-delivery PBE exist in  . The proofs of parts (ii)
and (iv)–(vii) of Theorem 1 also rely on Corollary 1, as we will see; thus, Corollary 1 is the
key to our approach to proving Theorem 1.
To summarize the above roadmap, Sections 5 and 6 establish the chain of inequali-
ties
optimal PBE proﬁt in  
≥ best full-delivery PBE proﬁt in   (by Deﬁnition 1)
= best full-delivery PBE proﬁt in  R (by Corollary 1)
> best full-delivery, constant-price PBE proﬁt in  R (by Proposition 7)
= static monopoly proﬁt with cost c/δ (by Corollary 2).
Before beginning our analysis of  R,w eﬁ r s tp r o v ep a r t( i )o fTheorem 1 directly. The
proof proceeds by ﬁrst showing that the seller’s proﬁt is continuous in price–delivery
paths (p x)t and then showing that any price–delivery path can be supported in PBE by
endowing consumers with the belief that the seller will never deliver the good if she ever
deviatesfromherprescribedprice–deliverypath. ThedetailsaredeferredtoAppendixA.
Proposition 2( Theorem 1(i)). An optimal PBE exists in  .
5.2 Existence of best full-delivery PBE in the model with rationing
We now begin our analysis of the full-delivery PBE of   and  R, and the relationship
between them. The goal of this subsection is to show that a best full-delivery PBE exists
in  R. We start with a deﬁnition.
only for technical convenience and simpliﬁes the proof of Lemma 3. The second assumption is substan-
tive, as Van Cayseele (1991) shows that under full commitment a monopoly can achieve proﬁts above static
monopoly proﬁts by using “inefﬁcient” rationing. The second assumption is descriptive in the presence of
a frictionless resale market. Alternatively, one could view the model with rationing entirely as a technical
aid in analyzing the model without rationing.
19Our results about  R, especially Proposition 4, may also be of independent value to readers interested
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Definition 2. Givenapricepath(p)t,av a l u a t i o nv is generic with respect to (p)t if
δt(v −pt)  = δt 
(v −pt )
for all t  = t . If not, v is nongeneric with respect to (p)t.
That is, a valuation v is generic with respect to (p)t if a consumer with valuation v
is not indifferent between purchasing at any two times t and t  when prices are given by
(p)t. For any price path (p)t, there are only countably many valuations that are non-
generic with respect to (p)t, so the assumption that F admits a strictly positive density
immediately yields the following observation.
Lemma 1. For any price path (p)t, the set of valuations v ∈[ v v] that are generic with
respect to (p)t has measure 1.
We now present a series of lemmas that are needed to prove existence of a best full-
delivery PBE in  R. The longer proofs are deferred to Appendix A.
Lemma 2 simply states that any two consumers with the same valuation receive the
same payoff in any PBE, and consumers with higher valuations receive higher payoffs.
Lemma 2. In any PBE of   or  R, any two consumers with the same valuation, v, receive
t h es a m eP B Ep a y o f f ,Vv.I fv ≥ v ,t h e nVv ≥ Vv .
Proof. The ﬁrst part follows because at any PBE, a consumer with valuation v can de-
viate to the strategy of another consumer with valuation v and receive the same payoff
as him, because the actions of a single consumer do not affect the path of play (in ei-
ther   or  R). The second part follows because at any PBE, a consumer with valuation
v ≥ v  can deviate to the strategy of a consumer with valuation v  and receive a weakly
higher payoff than him (in  R, this relies on the fact that a consumer with higher valua-
tion can purchase whenever a consumer with lower valuation can do so), again because
the actions of a single consumer do not affect the path of play.  
Thenexttwolemmasshowthat,acrossallfull-deliveryPBE,theprice–rationingpath
(p q)t uniquely determines the quantity path (Q)t. Lemma 3 is not trivial because the
set of times at which a consumer is able to purchase under price–rationing path (p q)t
depends on the times at which higher-valuation consumers are purchasing. The intu-
ition for the result is that if a consumer with valuation v cannot purchase at the same
set of times under two PBE, then there must be a nontrivial mass of higher-valuation
consumers who cannot purchase at the same set of times under the two PBE either,
because otherwise almost all higher-valuation consumers would purchase at the same
times under both PBE and the original consumer would not have been “rationed out” of
purchasing at his preferred time. Therefore, there can be no valuation v that is approxi-
mately the highest valuation that gets rationed out, which implies that no valuation can
be rationed out.492 Alexander Wolitzky Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Lemma 3. Given a price–rationing path (p q)t in  R and a valuation v that is generic
with respect to (p)t, there exists a time τv such that every consumer with valuation v pur-
chases at τv in any full-delivery PBE in  R with price–rationing path (p q)t.
Combining Lemma 1 and Lemma 3 immediately yields the following lemma.
Lemma 4. Given price–rationing path (p q)t, every full-delivery PBE in  R with price–
rationing path (p q)t has the same quantity path (Q)t.
In fact, this quantity path (Q)t can be viewed as a continuous function of the price–
rationing path (p q)t.
Lemma 5. The unique quantity path (Q)t that may occur in a full-delivery PBE in  R
with price–rationing path (p q)t is continuous in (p q)t in the product topology.
We now show that a best full-delivery PBE exists in the model with rationing (Propo-
sition 3). This holds because the set of full-delivery PBE price–rationing–quantity paths
can be shown to be compact in the product topology20 and the seller’s proﬁt is con-
tinuous in price–rationing–quantity paths. It is straightforward to show that the set of
full-delivery PBE price–rationing paths is compact: the seller can be induced to set any
price–rationing path if consumers believe that she will never deliver the good if she sets
the wrong path, and the seller is willing to deliver Q units of the good if she is willing to
deliver Q − ε for all small ε. The difﬁculty is showing that small changes in the price–
rationing path induce small changes in the quantity path. This is taken care of by Lem-
mas 4 and 5, which are both proved in Appendix A.
Proposition 3. A best full-delivery PBE exists in  R.
Proof.L e t F be the set of full-delivery PBE price–rationing–quantity paths (p q Q)t
in  R satisfying pt ∈[ v v] for all t. Note that if a PBE is best in the set of PBE with price–
rationing paths in F, then it is best overall, as any PBE with pt > v for some t yields
no more proﬁt than a PBE with an identical price–rationing path but with pt = v for all
sucht instead,andsimilarlyfor pt <v. Givenaprice–rationing–quantitypath (p q Q)t,
the associated proﬁt for the seller is
∞ 
t=0
δt(pt −c)min{qt Qt} 
which is obviously continuous in (p q Q)t in the product topology. We will show that F
is compact in the product topology, and then apply Weierstrass’ Theorem to complete
the proof.
Observe that F ⊆
∞
t=0([v v] [0 1] [0 1])t, which is compact by Tychonoff’s Theo-
rem. Therefore, to show that F is compact in the product topology, it sufﬁces to show
20Technically, thisholdsforpricepathswith pt ∈[ v v] forall t, towhichwecanrestrictattentionwithout
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that F is closed in the product topology. To see that it is, consider a sequence of paths
{(p q Q)t}n ∈ F converging pointwise to (p∗ q∗ Q∗)t. We must show that there exists a
full-delivery PBE with price–rationing–quantity path (p∗ q∗ Q∗)t. Consider the follow-
ing strategy proﬁle:
1. The seller sets price–rationing path (p∗ q∗)t and xt = 1 as long as she has con-
formed to this strategy in the past. Otherwise, she sets pt = v, qt = 1,a n dxt = 0 for
all future periods. In particular, the seller sets xt = 0 in any period in which she has
set pt  = p∗
t .
2. A consumer with valuation v who has not yet received the good at t accepts at t if
and only if the seller has never deviated from her prescribed strategy and δt(v −
p∗
t ) ≥ δτ(v −p∗
τ) for all τ ≥ t.
To establish that this proﬁle is a PBE, we ﬁrst observe that if the seller ever sets
pτ  = p∗
τ, she receives zero continuation payoff. Since this is her minmax value, she
cannot receive continuation payoff strictly less than this in any PBE; in particular, her
on-path continuation value after τ along (p q Q)t n is weakly positive for every n,s o
by continuity of proﬁts in (p q Q)t, we see that her on path continuation value after τ
along (p∗ q∗ Q∗)t is also weakly positive. This implies that setting pτ  = p∗
τ on path
is not a proﬁtable deviation. Similarly, the fact that setting xt = 1 is optimal on path
along (p q Q)t n for all n implies that setting xt = 1 is optimal on path in this strategy
proﬁle, because the cost of delivery and on-path continuation values are continuous
in (p q Q)t n, while the payoff of zero that results from deviating from the equilibrium
path in this proﬁle is at least as bad as the payoff from deviating in any PBE. Also, the
seller’soff-pathplayisoptimalbecauseoff-pathprice-settingdoesnotaffectherpayoffs
and off-path delivery imposes a positive cost at no beneﬁt.
We next check that each consumer’s play is optimal. It is again obvious that his
off-path play is optimal, as paying is costly and yields no beneﬁt when the seller sets
xt = 0. To see that his on-path play is optimal given (p∗ q∗ Q∗)t, note that accepting
at t yields δt(v − p∗
t ) if he pays (i.e., if he is allowed to purchase the good) and yields his
continuationpayoffotherwise,whilerejectingalwaysyieldshiscontinuationpayoffand
δt(v−p∗
t ) is weakly greater than his continuation payoff if δt(v−p∗
t ) ≥ δτ(v−p∗
τ) for all
τ ≥ t.
Finally, we must check that the prescribed consumer behavior actually induces
quantity path (Q∗)t.B yLemma 4, for any price–rationing path (p q)t, there is a unique
quantity path (Q)t that occurs in a full-delivery PBE with price–rationing path (p q)t,
and(Q)t iscontinuousin(p q)t by Lemma5. Therefore, the fact that (p q)t n converges
to (p∗ q∗)t implies that (Q)t n converges to (Q∗)t. Thus, there exists a full-delivery PBE
with price–rationing–quantity path (p∗ q∗ Q∗)t.
We have shown that F is closed, and therefore compact, in the product topology.
Weierstrass’ Theorem now implies that there is a point in F that maximizes proﬁts,
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5.3 Nonoptimality of rationing in the model with rationing
We now show that any best full-delivery PBE in  R involves no rationing on the equilib-
rium path. This is the central step in showing equivalence of best full-delivery PBE in  
and  R (Corollary 1), which is in turn our main tool in proving Theorem 1.
By Lemma 3, the path of play of a full-delivery PBE is given by a price–rationing
path (p q)t, up to differences in the play of the measure-zero set of consumers with
nongeneric valuations with respect to (p)t.L e tu sw r i t eDτ((p q)t) for the quantity de-
manded attime τ givenprice–rationing path (p q)t, i.e., themeasureofconsumerswho
would prefer to receive the good at time τ at price pτ than to receive their PBE pay-
off.21 Similarly, we say that a consumer demands the good at τ if she prefers receiving
the good at time τ at price pτ to receiving her PBE payoff. Finally, we say that rationing
occurs along a price–quantity–rationing path (p q)t if there exists a time τ such that
Dτ((p q)t)>q τ > 0.22 Note that in a full-delivery PBE in which Dτ((p q)t) ≤ qτ,ac o n -
sumer with nongeneric valuation who demands the good at τ must purchase at τ.23
Weshow thatevery bestfull-deliveryPBE in  R involves no rationing by arguing that
any full-delivery PBE involving rationing can be strictly improved upon by another full-
delivery PBE. The basic idea is that if rationing occurs at time t∗, modifying the equilib-
riumbyslightlyincreasingpriceatt∗,suchthatquantitysoldatt∗ remainsconstant,and
usingadditionalrationing toensurethatquantitysoldineveryotherperiod doesnotin-
crease, leads the timing of all sales to remain constant and therefore yields an increase
in proﬁts. However, the proof is complicated by the fact that, without ﬁrst ruling out
rationing, we cannot ensure that the price path is decreasing and cannot establish the
usual skimming property that higher-valuation consumers purchase earlier. The heart
of the proof involves showing that slightly increasing price at t∗ and using additional ra-
tioning to ensure that sales do not increase elsewhere cannot lead to a decrease in sales
at some other time τ. If it did, then those consumers who used to purchase at τ must
now purchase at some other time that is better for them than τ, as they still have the
option of earning surplus by purchasing at τ. Additionally, the fact that they have this
new opportunity means that some other higher-valuation consumers must also be pur-
chasing at a different time. Since higher-valuation consumers must purchase at some
point rather than never purchasing if lower-valuation consumers do so, following this
“trail” of consumers who purchase at different times ultimately shows that every con-
sumer (with generic valuation) who purchased before the price increase still purchases
after the price increase. The details of the proof are deferred to Appendix A.
Proposition4. In  R,norationingoccursalongabestfull-deliveryPBEprice–quantity–
rationing path.
21Throughout the paper, D(p) ≡ 1−F(p)is the static demand at price p,w h i l eDτ((p q)t) is the time-τ
demand in the dynamic model under price–rationing path (p q)t.
22If qt = 0, it is irrelevant whether we consider the monopoly to be rationing at t or to be setting price
equal to inﬁnity. We do not refer to this case as rationing for technical convenience.
23If Dτ((p q)t) = qτ, this may fail for a measure-zero set of consumers who demand the good at τ but
are unable to purchase at τ due to rationing. Since measure-zero sets of consumers are irrelevant for our
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5.4 Equivalence of best full-delivery PBE in the model with and without rationing
We are ﬁnally ready to prove Corollary 1, which establishes a very close relationship be-
tween best full-delivery PBE in the relational contracting model with and without ra-
tioning. The intuition for Corollary 1 is simple: by Proposition 4, no rationing occurs on
the equilibrium path in a best full-delivery PBE of  R, and the worst possible off-path
punishment (breaking off trade) does not require rationing, so a best full-delivery PBE
of  R can be no better than a best full-delivery PBE of  . The details of the proof, which
involves constructing a PBE in   corresponding to agiven price–quantity path in  R and
vice versa, is deferred to Appendix A. The constructed PBE have the same grim-trigger
structure as the PBE described in the proof of Proposition 3 and in Section 6.1.
Corollary 1. A price–quantity path (p Q)t is a best full-delivery PBE price–quantity
path in  R if and only if it is a best full-delivery PBE price–quantity path in  .
Corollary 1 combined with Proposition 3 immediately yields part (ii) of Theorem 1.
Proposition 5( Theorem 1(ii)). A best full-delivery PBE exists in  .
6. Properties of best full-delivery equilibria
6.1 High proﬁts and supermonopoly pricing
In this subsection, we use the facts about  R and its relationship to   established in
Section 5 to prove parts (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 1.
We ﬁrst show that proﬁts in a best full-delivery PBE in  R (which exists, by Propo-
sition 3) converge to the static monopoly proﬁt as δ approaches 1, which is not dif-
ﬁcult. Corollary 1 then implies that the same is true in  . To see why payoffs in the
best full-delivery PBE in  R converge to static monopoly proﬁts as δ approaches 1,l e t
D(p) ≡ 1 − F(p)—the static demand at price p—and consider the following strategy
proﬁle, where γ is a constant in (0 (pm −c)/pm).
1. The seller sets price–rationing–delivery path pt = pm, qt = γ(1 − γ)tD(pm),a n d
xt = 1 as long as she has conformed to this strategy in the past. Otherwise, she sets
pt = v, qt = 1,a n dxt = 0 for all future periods. In particular, the seller sets xt = 0 in
any period in which she has set pt  = pm
t .
2. A consumer with valuation v who has not yet received the good accepts if and only
if the seller has never deviated from her prescribed strategy and v ≥ pm.
Thatis, thesellerkeepspriceﬁxedatthestaticmonopolyprice, pm, andsellstofrac-
tion γ of those consumers who demand the good each period, while consumers accept
if and only if v ≥ pm and the seller has never deviated. It is clear that consumers’ play is
optimal, and that the seller can never beneﬁt from setting a different value of pt or qt,
so checking that this proﬁle is an equilibrium reduces to checking that the seller prefers
to deliver the good. The proof of Proposition 6 shows that the seller does, in fact, prefer
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yields approximately static monopoly proﬁts, as the cost of delay involved in selling to
only fraction γ of the consumers who demand the good each period is small. Therefore,
proﬁts in a best full-delivery PBE in  R must approximate static monopoly proﬁts for δ
close to 1 as well.
Proposition 6( Theorem 1(iii)). For both   and  R, for all ε>0, there exists δ<1 such
that, for all δ>δ, there exists a full-delivery PBE under which the seller’s payoff is within
ε of the static monopoly payoff.
Proof. We prove the result for  R below. Proposition 3 then implies that, for every
δ>δ,thereexistsabestfull-deliveryPBEin R underwhichtheseller’spayoffiswithinε
of the static monopoly payoff. Corollary 1 in turn implies that the same is true in  .
Recall that pm is the static monopoly price, so the static monopoly payoff is
(pm −c)D(pm). Suppose that pm >c , i.e., that positive proﬁts are possible: the case
where this fails is trivial.
Consider the strategy proﬁle described above for γ some constant in (0 (pm − c)/
pm). It is clear that each consumer’s strategy is a best reply. Note also that qt = Qt for
all t along the equilibrium path. To check only that this proﬁle describes a PBE, we must
checkonlythatthesellerhasanincentivetodeliverthegoodalongtheequilibriumpath,
since any other deviation yields continuation payoff zero against positive continuation
payoff from conforming. This condition is
∞ 
τ=1
δτqt+τ(pt+τ −c)≥ qtc for all t ≥ 0 












(pm −c)≥ c 
Rearranging this inequality gives
γ ≤
δpm −c
δpm   (1)
Thus, the strategy proﬁle above is a PBE for any γ satisfying (1). Since pm >c ,t h e r e
exists γ>0 such that the strategy proﬁle above is a PBE for high enough δ,i np a r t i c u l a r
for δ>c/ p m.
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for the seller. As δ approaches 1, this converges to D(pm)(pm − c), completing the
proof.  
The intuition for this result is that, for δ high enough (δ>c/ p m), the seller can cred-
ibly deliver the good to those consumers willing to pay the monopoly price at a ﬁxed
positive rate γ, and taking δ to 1 means that the loss from delay involved in this strategy
is insigniﬁcant. Observe that, while the proof of Proposition 6 shows that, in  R,t h e r e
exists a single strategy proﬁle that is a PBE for all sufﬁciently high δ and that yields prof-
itsconvergingtostaticmonopolyproﬁtsas δ convergesto 1, suchastrategyproﬁleneed
not exist in  .
Note that the strategy proﬁle described in the proof of Proposition 6,w i t hp = pm,
is not a best full-delivery PBE in  R for ﬁxed δ<1. Indeed, there exist full-delivery PBE
in  R with constant-price paths (i.e., pt = pt  for all t, t ) that yield higher proﬁts. To see
this, consider the strategy proﬁle in the proof of Proposition 6 with pm replaced by some





The argument in the proof of Proposition 6 that led to equation (1)s h o w st h a tγ∗(p) is
the fastest rate at which the seller can sell in a full-delivery PBE in which price is ﬁxed
at p. This implies that the seller’s proﬁt in the best full-delivery PBE with a constant













Note that the ﬁrst term of (2) represents the cost of the delay in sales required to induce
the seller to deliver, while the second term is simply the static proﬁt at price p. Raising p
above pm yieldsaﬁrst-orderincreaseintheﬁrsttermin(2)andasecond-orderdecrease
in the product of the second and third terms, so the seller does better to sell at price
above pm. The intuition is similar to that of Section 4: raising price reduces quantity,
which reduces the seller’s temptation to fail to deliver, and, with durable goods, this
allowsthesellertosellatafasterrate. Morespeciﬁcally,therequireddelayinsalesforces
a seller who would receive p − c per unit sold under full commitment to receive only
p−c/δper unit sold, so, with a constant-price path, a seller with cost c c a nd on ob e t t e r







from which it is clear that the best full-delivery, ﬁxed-price PBE in which the seller sells
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and sales rate γ = γ∗(pm(c/δ)). In fact, it is not hard to show that this is the best full-
delivery, ﬁxed-price PBE overall: all that remains to show this is to establish that selling
at the constant rate γ∗(p) is optimal given that prices are ﬁxed at any given p,w h i c h
follows from a standard dynamic programming argument.24
Corollary 2. If v>c/ δ , the best full-delivery, constant-price PBE in  R is given by pt =
pm(c/δ) and qt = γ∗(pm(c/δ))(1 − γ∗(pm(c/δ)))tD(pm(c/δ)). Furthermore, (pm(c/δ) −
c/δ)D(pm(c/δ)) is a lower bound on the best full-delivery PBE proﬁt in both   and  R.
Proof. Given the ﬁrst part of the result, the second part follows immediately from
Corollary 1.
Suppose pt = p forall t.L e tQ bethestaticdemandforprice p. Theproblemofﬁnd-
ing the best full-delivery PBE with a constant price p in  R reduces to ﬁnding the best
number of consumers to sell to in every period while maintaining the seller’s incentive
to deliver the good; i.e., to solving the functional equation
V( Q )= max
q≤Q such that δV (Q−q)≥qc
(p−c)q+δV (Q −q)  (3)
Standard dynamic programming results imply that there is at most one solution to
this equation with a nontrivial set satisfying the constraints. Conjecture that V( Q )=
((δp−c)/δ)Q. The right-hand side of (3) then becomes
max
q≤((δp−c)/(δp))Q


















where the constraint set is nontrivial if p>c / δ . Therefore, (p − c/δ)Q is the highest
proﬁt attainable by a price path ﬁxed at p>c/ δwhen there are Q remaining consumers
with valuations greater than p,a n d0 is the highest such proﬁt if p ≤ c/δ(as the solution
to (3) must be nonincreasing in p). Setting Q = D(p) and maximizing over p completes
the proof.  
Finally, we note that (nonconstant-price) full-delivery PBE of  R exist that yield
proﬁts strictly above static monopoly proﬁts with cost equal to c/δ if v>c / δ .F o r e x -
ample, consider modifying the best full-delivery, constant-price path by increasing p0
from pm(c/δ) to pm(c/δ) + ε for ε small. We claim that for small ε, q0 consumers will
still pay p0. This follows because a consumer with valuation v demands the good at
time 0 and price p0 if v − pm(c/δ) − ε ≥ δ(v − pm(c/δ)) or ε ≤ (1 − δ)(v − pm(c/δ)).
This holds for all consumers with v>p m(c/δ) in the limit as ε goes to 0,a n dq0 =
((δpm(c/δ)−c)/(δpm(c/δ)))D(pm(c/δ)), which is strictly less than 1 − F(pm(c/δ)).I n
addition, there exists ε>0 such that more than q0 consumers demand the good at
24Corollary 2 applies only to the case v>c/ δ . Proposition 9 shows that if v ≤ c/δ, there is no full-delivery
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time 0 when p0 = pm(c/δ) + ε. And the continuation path of play from t = 1 onward
is the same under the modiﬁed strategy proﬁle as under the best constant-price PBE,
so the modiﬁed proﬁle yields strictly higher proﬁts overall. This yields part (iv) of Theo-
rem 1.
Proposition 7( Theorem 1(iv)). If v>c/ δ , there exists a full-delivery PBE of  R (when
costequalsc)yieldingproﬁtsstrictlygreaterthanstaticmonopolyproﬁtswhencostequals
c/δ.B yCorollary 1, the same is true of full-delivery PBE of  .
Before leaving this subsection, note that Corollary 2 suggests that the best full-
delivery PBE of the relational contracting model may involve pricing above the static
monopoly level. We demonstrate this here in a simple, two-type example.25
Example 1. Suppose that half the consumers have valuation 2 36, while the other half
have valuation 2 12.L e tc =  38 and δ =  4. Note that the static monopoly price is 2 12,a s
this yields proﬁt 1 74, while setting price equal to 2 36 yields proﬁt  99. In the dynamic
model, the discussion preceding Corollary 2 implies that the best full-delivery PBE with
price ﬁxed at 2 36 yields proﬁt (2 36 −  38
 4 ) 5 =  71, while the best PBE with price ﬁxed
at 2 12 yields proﬁt (2 12 −  38
 4 )1 = 1 17. Alternatively, one can check that setting p0 =
2 26 and pt = 2 12 for all t ≥ 1, and selling to all high-valuation consumers in period
zero and then selling to the low-valuation consumers at the fastest possible rate yields
proﬁt (2 26 −  38) 5 +  4(2 12 −  38
 4 ) 5 = 1 174. Furthermore, this is a PBE price–quantity
path, as high-valuation consumers receive 2 36 − 2 26 =  1 from purchasing in period
zero and at most  4(2 36 − 2 12) =  096 from purchasing at a later date, while the seller
gains  4(2 12−  38
 4 ) 5 =  234 from delivering the good at time zero and gains  38∗ 5 =  19
from failing to deliver.26 Since this full-delivery PBE yields higher proﬁt than the best
PBE that ﬁxes price at the monopoly price of 2 12, which is clearly the best PBE in which
allpricesareweaklybelowthemonopolyprice,thebestfull-deliveryPBEinthisexample
must have pt >p m for some time t. ♦
6.2 Declining prices
Finally, we establish three additional important properties of best full-delivery PBE of  
and  R, which hold for any ﬁxed discount factor (parts (v)–(vii) of Theorem 1). We ﬁrst
use the possibility of rationing to ensure that best full-delivery PBE involve strictly de-
creasing price paths and positive sales each period. The idea is that delaying sales is
wasteful and rationing can be used to ensure that speeding up sales does not violate the
seller’s incentive compatibility constraint, which might otherwise be a concern.
25This example does not exactly ﬁt our model, as we have assumed a continuous distribution of valua-
tions. However, the example can be slightly perturbed to yield a distribution that satisﬁes our assumptions,
and noting that every best full-delivery PBE price path is decreasing (by Proposition 8), we conjecture that
the best full-delivery PBE in the perturbed example will have p0 >p m.
26Corresponding off-path play may be taken to be as in the strategy proﬁle in the proof of Proposition 6,
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Proposition 8( Theorem 1(v)). If v>c / δ , any best full-delivery PBE of   or  R has a
strictly decreasing price path and strictly positive sales each period.
Proof. We prove the result for  R, whence the result for   follows by Corollary 1.I fv>
c/δ, full-delivery PBE exist in which the seller makes positive proﬁts (by Proposition 7),
so any best full-delivery PBE of  R yields positive proﬁts.27 Suppose that (p q)t is such
a best full-delivery PBE price path (which exists by Proposition 3). By Proposition 4,
Dτ((p q)t) ≤ qτ for all τ,s oQτ = Dτ((p q)t) for all τ. Suppose that there exists some
time τ such that Dτ((p q)t) = 0.L e t t∗ be the ﬁrst such time. If t∗ = 0,t h e nd e ﬁ n ea
new path by letting p 
t = pt+1 and q 
t = qt+1, i.e., shifting the original price–rationing
path forward one period, which implies that Q 
t = Qt+1, so proﬁts under the new path
are 1/δ times proﬁts under the original path, contradicting the optimally of the original
path. If t∗ > 0,l e tvt∗−1 be the lowest valuation such that a consumer with valuation
vt∗−1 demands the good at t∗ − 1, which is well deﬁned because a positive measure of
consumers demand the good at t∗ − 1, by deﬁnition of t∗.W e ﬁ r s t c l a i m t h a t vt∗−1 >
pt∗−1. To see this, ﬁrst note that a consumer with valuation vt∗−1 can demand the good
at t∗ − 1 only if vt∗−1 ≥ pt∗−1.I f vt∗−1 = pt∗−1, then it must be true that pτ = pt∗−1 for
all τ>t ∗ − 1, since the price path is weakly decreasing by assumption, and if the price
ever falls strictly below pt∗−1, then all consumers with valuations sufﬁciently close to
pt∗−1 prefer to wait until this time to purchase and all but at most a set of measure 0 of
these consumers have the option of doing so since Dτ((p q)t) ≤ qτ for all τ.T h e f a c t
that Dτ((p q)t) ≤ qτ for all τ then implies that Qτ = 0 for all τ>t ∗ −1,a sa l lc o n s u m e r s
prefer to purchase at t∗ − 1 than at any later time. Therefore, continuation proﬁts from
time t∗ − 1 onward equal 0, which implies that the seller does not deliver at t∗ − 1.T h i s
in turn implies that no consumers pay at t∗ − 1, so that continuation proﬁts from time
t∗ −2 onward equal 0 as well. By induction, continuation proﬁts from time 0 onward are
0, contradicting the fact that any best full-delivery PBE yields positive proﬁts if v>c/ δ .
Now consider modifying (p q)t by changing pt∗ to (pt∗−1 −(1−δ)vt∗−1)/δ. Since
vt∗−1 >p t∗−1,w eh a v ept∗ <p t∗−1, and it is easy to check that all consumers with valua-
tion weakly greater than vt∗−1 continue to demand the good at t∗ − 1. By the skimming
property(whichiseasilyseentoholdduetodecliningpricesandnorationing),theseller
can sell a positive quantity at date t∗ + τ only if pt∗+τ <( p t∗−1 −(1−δτ+1)vt∗−1)/δτ+1,
so the seller strictly prefers selling to some mass of consumers at t∗ a tt h en e wp r i c et o
selling to them at any point in the future. Next observe that under the new price there
is strictly positive demand at t∗, since at the new price a consumer with valuation vt∗−1
strictly prefers to purchase at t∗ − 1 than to purchase at any other time except t∗, and is
indifferentbetweenpurchasingat t∗−1 andpurchasingat t∗,s oac o n s u m e rw i t hv a l u a -
tion slightly below vt∗−1 strictly prefers purchasing at t∗ to purchasing at any other time.
Furthermore, the total sales at all future dates to consumers who do not buy at t∗ is left
unchanged, so total proﬁts are strictly higher under the new path. Finally, the potential
complication that the seller’s incentive compatibility constraint may be violated at t∗
can be addressed by rationing at t∗, since the necessity of positive continuation proﬁts
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from t∗ on implies that the seller can credibly sell a strictly positive quantity at t∗.S o
the modiﬁed path (possibly with rationing at t∗) strictly improves on the original path,
contradicting the assumption that Dτ((p q)t) = 0 for some τ.
We have shown that every best full-delivery PBE induces strictly positive sales at
every date. Since every best full-delivery PBE involves no rationing, this is possible only
if every best full-delivery PBE has a strictly declining price path.  
We are now ready to complete the proof of Theorem 1 by proving parts (vi) and (vii),
which show that every best full-delivery PBE of   (or  R) has an equilibrium price path
(p)t that asymptotes to a price at least as high as max{v c/δ} as t goes to inﬁnity. The
intuitionisthatabestfull-deliveryPBEhasadecliningpricepathbyProposition8,ther e
isnoreasontopricebelowv,andpricesmustbeatleastc/δinanyfull-deliveryPBEwith
a declining price path in which the seller ever delivers, in analogy with Proposition 1.
The following lemma formalizes the last part of this intuition.
Lemma 6. In any full-delivery PBE of   or  R with price–quantity path (p q)t in which
pt ≥ pt+1 for all t and a strictly positive quantity of the good is delivered along the equi-
librium path, pt >c/ δfor all t.
Proof.C o n s i d e r  R ﬁrst. Suppose that Q consumers have not yet received the good at
timet∗. Weﬁrstnotethattheseller’scontinuationproﬁtfromtimet∗ onwardisbounded
from above by her continuation proﬁt from time t∗ onward in a best full-delivery PBE of
the modiﬁed continuation game where she is constrained to price weakly below pt∗ and
all remaining consumers’ valuations are set to pt∗. This follows because in the modiﬁed
game, the seller can set the original continuation price path (p)t≥t∗ and use rationing to
sell according to the original price–quantity path.
The seller’s continuation value at t∗ in a full-delivery PBE of the modiﬁed game is
therefore bounded from above by the solution to equation (3)w i t hp = pt∗.A ss h o w ni n
the proof of Corollary 2, equation (3) has a solution with V( Q )>0 if and only if δpt∗ >c.
So if pt∗ ≤ c/δ, the seller’s continuation value at t∗ equals 0 in any full-delivery PBE in
the modiﬁed game and, therefore, equals 0 in any full-delivery PBE of the unmodiﬁed
game as well. This implies the seller delivers 0 units of the good at time t∗,w h i c ht h e n
implies that no buyers pay anything to the seller at time t∗, so the seller’s continuation
value at t∗ − 1 equals 0 as well. By induction, the seller’s continuation value equals 0 at
all periods, and the seller never delivers a positive quantity of the good.
By Proposition 3 and Corollary 1, the above argument shows that in any full-delivery
PBE of   with a declining price, the seller’s continuation value starting from any t∗ sat-
isfying pt∗ ≤ c/δ is 0. As above, this implies that the seller never delivers any positive
quantity of the good.  
Proposition 9( Theorem 1(vi) and (vii)). Any best full-delivery PBE of   or  R has pt >
c/δand pt ≥ v for all t if v>c/ δ .I fv ≤ c/δ, there is no PBE in   or  R in which the seller
ever delivers the good or receives positive payments.502 Alexander Wolitzky Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Proof.I f v>c/ δ , the price path of any best full-delivery PBE of   or  R is declining, by
Proposition 8, and any full-deliveryPBE with a decliningprice path has pt >c/ δforall t,
by Lemma 6. Finally, modifying any declining price path in  R by replacing all pt <v
with v and using rationing to ensure delivery yields a strict increase in proﬁts if pt <v
for any t (as sales occur in every period in a best full-delivery PBE, by Proposition 8), so
the result for v>c/ δholds for  R. Corollary 1 then implies that it also holds for  .
Suppose that v ≤ c/δ and that mass Q consumers have not yet received the good at
some time t in   or  R. If the seller delivers q units of the good at time t, she cannot
receive total payments of more than vq and must of course be willing to deliver the q
units. Therefore, her continuation payoff from time t onward is bounded from above by
thesolutiontoequation(3)withp = v. Aswehaveseen,theonlysolutiontoequation(3)
when v ≤ c/δis V( Q )= 0 for all Q.S on oP B Ei n  or  R yields positive proﬁts if v ≤ c/δ,
which, as in the proof of Lemma 6, implies that no PBE involves delivery or positive
payments.  
7. An extension:E xogenous chance of nondelivery
Ouranalysisisbasedontheassumptionthatthesellerhastheoptionoffailingtodeliver
the good after receiving payment. We have argued that the presence of equilibria that
yield high proﬁts for the seller under this assumption suggests that sellers may try to
avoid committing themselves to delivering the good. However, in some environments
sellers may be automatically committed to delivery; for example, taking payment for a
good and then failing to provide it may be viewed by courts as breaching an implicit
contract, particularly if the seller has always provided the good to paying customers in
the past (as is the case in full-delivery PBE). In this section, we show that our model can
easilybeextendedtoanenvironment inwhichthisconcernthatthesellermaybeinvol-
untarilycommittedtodeliverydoesnotapply. Inparticular, weassumethatineverype-
riod there is an exogenous, independent probability η>0 that the seller privately learns
that she is unable to deliver the good after receiving payment.28 For example, the seller
may require certain specialized inputs to produce the ﬁnal good, and these inputs may
not always be available (and consumers and courts may be unable to observe whether
the inputs are available). In this model, the seller periodically fails to deliver the good
even if she wishes to deliver in every period, and since courts cannot tell whether failure
to deliver results from lack of inputs or opportunistic behavior by the seller, there is no
possibility that the seller can be involuntarily committed to trying to deliver the good in
every period.
The equilibria we have constructed for both the nondurable- and durable-goods
models can easily be adapted to this environment by specifying that no purchases or
delivery occur after any nondelivery by the seller (so that trade eventually breaks down
on the equilibrium path) and that prior to the breakdown of trade, consumers take into
account that they receive the good only with probability 1 − η even if they pay (since
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consumers are risk-neutral, this implies that the mass of consumers who wish to pur-
chase at price p is now D(p/(1−η)) rather than D(p)). That is, our results are contin-
uous in η. Rather than formally stating this rather natural ﬁnding, we instead focus on
characterizing the best full-delivery, constant-price PBE in  R,i na n a l o g yt oCorollary 2,
which provides an intuitive lower bound on the best full-delivery PBE proﬁt in both  
and  R.I tt u r n so u tt h a tt h ea n a l y s i so fSection 6.1 carries through with the sole modi-
ﬁcation that D(p) is replaced by D(p/(1−η)): the intuition for this result is that, in the
best full-delivery PBE, the seller is indifferent between delivering the good and break-
ing off trade, so she is not made worse off by the possibility that trade may break off
exogenously (except insofar as this causes consumers with valuations v ∈[ p p/(1−η)]
to reject her price offer). Finally, we remark that our original deﬁnition of a full-delivery
PBEdoesnotallowforthepossibilitythattradebreaksdowninequilibrium,whichleads
us to use the following, somewhat ad hoc, deﬁnition in the statement of the result.
Definition 3. Amodiﬁed full-delivery PBE is a PBE in which the seller sets xt = 1 at all
on-path histories at which Qt > 0 and sets xt = 0 at all on-path histories at which Qt = 0.
Our earlier results pertaining to full-delivery PBE (in particular, Corollary 1)a l s oa p -
ply to modiﬁed full-delivery PBE.
Proposition 10. If v>c / δ , the best modiﬁed full-delivery, constant-price PBE in
 R is given by pt = argmaxp(p − c/δ)D(p/(1−η)) ≡ p∗(η) and qt = γ∗(p∗(η)) ×
(1−γ∗(p∗(η)))tD(p∗(η)/(1−η)),w h e r eγ∗(p) = (δp−c)/(δp)as in Section 6.1.
Proof. A consumer who demands the good at price p receives it with probability
at most 1 − η,s oa tm o s tD(p/(1−η)) consumers ever purchase in a full-delivery
PBE with constant price p. The argument in the proof of Corollary 2 shows that if
the seller faces this demand curve and can freely choose what quantity to deliver in
every period, her best (modiﬁed) full-delivery PBE proﬁt with constant price p equals
(p−c/δ)D(p/(1−η)). Therefore, (p∗(η)−c/δ)D(p∗(η)/(1−η)) is an upper bound on
the seller’s best modiﬁed full-delivery, constant-price PBE proﬁt when, in each period,
she may be unable to deliver the good with probability η.
We claim that the following strategy proﬁle attains this upper bound: the seller sets
(pt qt) asin thestatementoftheproposition, sets xt = 1 until theﬁrsttimethatdelivery
is impossible, and subsequently sets xt = 0; a consumer with valuation v demands the
good if and only if v ≥ p/(1−η) and the seller has always set pt = p∗(η) and delivered
the good in the past. The only nontrivial part of verifying that this proﬁle is a PBE is
checking that it is optimal for the seller to deliver the good when prescribed. Nondeliv-
ery leads to continuation payoff 0 and in every period prior to the ﬁrst nondelivery, the
sellerfailstodeliverwithprobability η. Therefore, theconditionthatitis optimalforthe
seller to deliver the good when prescribed at time t is
∞ 
τ=1
(1−η)τ−1δτqt+τ(pt+τ −c(1−η)) ≥ qtc 504 Alexander Wolitzky Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
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exactly as in (1), which holds by deﬁnition of γ∗(p∗(η)). This veriﬁes that the above
strategy proﬁle is a modiﬁed full-delivery, constant-price PBE, and it is straightforward
to check that it yields expected proﬁt (p∗(η)−c/δ)D(p∗(η)/(1−η)).  
Thus, Proposition 10 shows that the lower bound on optimal monopoly proﬁts de-
rived in Section 6.1 extends naturally to environments with an exogenous change of
nondelivery, where it may be more realistic to view the seller as having the option of
nondelivery.
8. Conclusion
The main insight of this paper is that the optimal pricing strategy of a dynamic
monopoly may be very different from that in traditional models when the relation-
ship between the seller and consumers is regulated by relational incentives. Unlike in
Hart and Tirole (1988), a nondurable-goods monopoly in our model can earn high prof-
its even if consumers are nonanonymous, provided the discount factor is sufﬁciently
high. Unlike in Coase (1972), a durable-goods monopoly can earn approximately static
monopolyproﬁtsinthelimitasthediscountfactorapproaches1,evenifthelowestcon-
sumer valuation is above the marginal cost of production. A durable-goods monopoly
can also earn high proﬁts when the discount factor is bounded away form one.
While our model has many equilibria, restricting attention to the best equilibria for
the seller brings out some novel economic intuitions and empirical predictions. First,
for both nondurable- and durable-goods monopolies, the temptation to fail to deliver
provides an incentive for pricing above the static monopoly level.29 The intuition is the
same in both cases: The larger the quantity of the good a monopoly is supposed to de-
liver, the greater is its incentive to renege. So the monopoly beneﬁts from restricting
quantity, and the most proﬁtable way for it to restrict quantity is to raise price. Sec-
ond, in the durable-goods case, the monopoly has an incentive to gradually cut prices
29This possibility that dynamic monopolies may price higher than static monopolies is a prediction of
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over time, using high prices rather than rationing to restrict sales early on. These new
effects have potentially interesting applications for regulation. In traditional models,
observing a monopoly cutting its price is a sign that consumers are doing better than
they would be if the monopoly had full commitment power, since they are paying lower
prices and (if the discount factor is high) are not facing costly delays in purchasing. In
our model, however, consumers may be better off when the monopoly has full commit-
mentpowerfortworeasons: theymayfacelowerprices(sincewithoutcommitment,the
monopoly may price above the static monopoly price) and they may receive the good
signiﬁcantly faster. This also points to an important empirical prediction of our model:
in contrast to the standard full-commitment and no-commitment models of durable-
goods monopoly, our model predicts that a monopoly will cut prices over time, but will
do so slowly enough that the costs from delay are signiﬁcant.
We also introduce two methodological innovations. First, we use an augmented
model with rationing to help analyze the durable-goods seller problem. This greatly
simpliﬁes the analysis by allowing us to construct simple equilibria with ﬂat price paths
in the model with rationing, and then use the relationship between the model with and
without rationing to draw conclusions about best full-delivery equilibria in the model
without rationing. Second, and more generally, we use relational incentives to replace
the temptation to deviate at the contract offer stage (price offers in our model) with the
temptationtodeviateatthecontractexecutionstage(deliveryofthegoodinourmodel),
which may have applications to other areas where studying dynamics in the presence of
adverse selection has proved difﬁcult. For example, recall that in our model of non-
durable goods and nonanonymous consumers, the dynamic enforcement constraint
that the seller delivers the good replaced the ratchet effect in price-setting. Perhaps fur-
ther insights may be gained from applying this idea to dynamic principal–agent prob-
lems with adverse selection, where characterizing dynamics in models with no commit-
ment is difﬁcult due to the ratchet effect (see, e.g., Laffont and Tirole 1988).
Appendix A: Omitted proofs
Proof ofProposition1. We ﬁrst observe thattheproblemof ﬁnding thebestPBE for
the seller is equivalent to ﬁnding the best PBE for the seller when she can fully commit
to her sequence of prices ({pt n}n)t. To see this, note that we can specify off-path beliefs
for buyers such that each buyer expects the seller to never deliver the good following
any deviation in price-setting by the seller. Given these beliefs, no buyer will ever accept
a strictly positive price in any period following a deviation in price-setting by the seller,
so the seller always receives continuation payoff zero, equal to her minmax payoff, after
any such deviation.
Using this observation and applying the revelation principle to each period, we can
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xt(v)f(v)dv for all t  (DE)
Notethatthethirdconstraintistheseller’sincentivecompatibility(IC)constraint,which
wealsorefertoasthedynamicenforcement(DE)constraint. SubstitutingforTt(v)using
the (IR)a n d( IC) constraints in the usual way, and temporarily ignoring the resulting



























xt(v)f(v)dv for all t 
Let {x∗
t (v)}t be a solution to this problem. Note that, for all t, x∗


























since the solution to this program maximizes both the original objective and the left-
hand side of each original constraint over all xt(·) that satisfy the original time t con-
straint. This implies that, for all t, t ,i f(v −c)f(v)−(1−F(v))>0,t h e nx∗









t +τ(v)dv, while if (v −c)f(v)−(1−F(v))<0,t h e n
x∗
t (v) = x∗




t+τ(v)dv is bounded from above, there exists a
ﬁnite x∗(·) such that x∗(v) = supt x∗
t (v) if (v − c)f(v)− (1 − F(v))≥ 0 and x∗(v) = 0 oth-
erwise.
We claim that xt(v) = x∗(v) forall t and v inanysolutiontothisproblem. Clearly,the




















































where the ﬁrst equality is by the deﬁnition of x∗(v), the second inequality is immediate,
thethirdinequalityfollowsbecause {x∗
t (v)}t satisﬁesthe(DE)constraintforall t,an dthe
fourth equality follows because x∗
t (v) ≥ x∗
t (v) if and only if x∗
t (v ) ≥ x∗
t (v ) for any t, t , v,
and v ,s ot h esup may be moved inside the integral. The above chain of inequalities im-
plies that repeating x∗(v) satisﬁes the seller’s incentive compatibility constraint. Finally,
if there exists t such that x∗
t (v)  = x∗(v), then the allocation {x∗
t (v)}t yields strictly lower
proﬁt than repeating x∗(v) in period t and yields weakly lower proﬁt in all other periods,
so every solution to the original problem has the same allocation rule in every period.

























x(v)f(v)dv for all t 















If the constraint is slack, we have standard monopoly pricing. If the constraint is bind-
ing, noting that our assumptions on F(v)imply that x(v) continues to take a cutoff form
whereby x(v) = 0 if v<v ∗ and x(v) = 1 if v ≥ v∗ for some v∗ yields that, for any v ≥ v∗,
price equals v−
 v
v∗ x(s)ds = v∗. Additionally, complementary slackness implies that the
constraintisbindingifandonlyifpm ≤ c/δ. Finally,notethatinanycasethesesolutions
satisfy the monotonicity constraint.
Ifv<c/ δ ,thenv∗ > v,sox(v) = 0forallv,whichimpliesthatthesellerneverdelivers
the good or receives positive payments in any optimal PBE. Since the seller’s minmax
payoff is zero, every PBE is optimal if v<c / δ , which proves the result in the v<c / δ
case.  
Proof ofProposition2. The proofis similar to theproofof Proposition 3, so we omit
some details. Let F be the set of PBE price–quantity–delivery paths (p Q x)t satisfying
pt ∈[ v v] for all t. If a PBE is optimal in the set of PBE with price–demand–delivery508 Alexander Wolitzky Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
paths in F, then it is optimal overall. Furthermore, it is clear that the seller’s PBE payoff
is continuous in price–quantity–delivery paths (p Q x)t in the product topology.
Next, we note that the continuation value of a consumer with valuation v facing
price–quantity–delivery path (p Q x)t at time t is continuous in (p Q x)t in the prod-
uct topology.30 To see this, observe that the maximum gain in continuation value over
an ε ball about (p Q x)t ∈ F is no more than (1+v)ε/(1−δ), corresponding to receiv-
ing the good, valued at v, with additional probability ε in each period, and paying ε less
in each period. This converges to 0 as ε does.
W en o ws h o wt h a tF is compact in the product topology. Observe that F ⊆ ∞
t=0([v v] [0 1] [0 1])t, which is compact by Tychonoff’s Theorem. Therefore, it suf-
ﬁces to show that F is closed in the product topology. To see that it is, consider a se-
quence of paths {(p Q x)t}n ∈ F converging pointwise to (p∗ Q∗ x∗)t.W em u s ts h o w
that there exists a PBE with price–demand–delivery path (p∗ Q∗ x∗)t. Consider the fol-
lowing strategy proﬁle.
1. The seller sets price–delivery path (p∗ x∗)t as long as she has conformed to this
strategy in the past. Otherwise, she sets pt = v and xt = 0 for all future periods. In
particular, the seller sets xt = 0 in any period in which she has set pt  = p∗
t .
2. A consumer with valuation v who has not yet received the good at t pays at





t+1,w h e r eV v
t+1 is the continuation value of such a consumer facing
(p∗ Q∗ x∗)t.
The proof that the seller’s play is optimal is as in the proof of Proposition 3.T os e e
that each consumer’s play is optimal, ﬁrst note that it is obvious that her off-path play
is optimal, as paying is costly and yields no beneﬁt when the seller sets xt = 0.T os e e





t+1, while not paying gives δV v






That the prescribed consumer behavior induces quantity path (Q∗)t follows from
the observation that each consumer’s payoff is continuous in (p Q x)t and that each
consumer plays a best response to each (p Q x)t n in equilibrium. This completes the
argument that F is closed, and therefore compact, in the product topology. Weierstrass’
Theorem then implies that there is a point in F that maximizes proﬁts, completing the
proof.  
Proof of Lemma 3. Fix a price–rationing path (p q)t and two full-delivery PBE σ and
σ .L e tV be the set of generic valuations v such that there exists a consumer with valu-
ation v who purchases at different times under σ and σ . Suppose, toward a contradic-
tion, that V is nonempty. Then V has a supremum, which we denote by v∗.L e tVv∗ be
the payoff of a consumer with valuation v∗ under σ,l e tV  
v∗ be the payoff of a consumer
with valuation v∗ under σ , and, without loss of generality, assume that Vv∗ ≥ V  
v∗.
30This continuation value is well deﬁned here by standard dynamic programming arguments, because,
unlike in the model with rationing, each consumer faces the same optimization problem regardless of the
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We ﬁrst claim that Vv∗ = V  
v∗. To see this, suppose that there exists a consumer with
valuation v∗ who purchases at time τv∗ under σ and purchases at time τ 
v∗  = τv∗ under
σ ,w i t hδτv∗(v∗ − pτv∗)>δ τ 
v∗(v∗ − pτ 
v∗), so that the consumer receives a higher payoff
under σ. Thisispossibleonlyiftheconsumerisunabletopurchaseattime τv∗ under σ ,
which in turn is possible only if strictly more than qτv∗ consumers accept price pτv∗ at
time τv∗ under σ . Since the consumer is able to purchase at time τv∗ under σ,w h i c hi s
possible only if no more than qτv∗ consumers accept price pτv∗ at time τv∗ under σ,t h i s
implies that there is a positive measure μ of consumers with valuations greater than v∗
whopurchaseat τv∗ under σ  butnotunder σ.B yLemma1,thisimpliesthatthereexists
a consumer with valuation v  >v ∗ and v  generic with respect to (p)t who purchases at
different times under σ and σ , which contradicts the fact that v∗ = sup{v:v ∈ V}.T h i s
implies that Vv∗ = V  
v∗, which also implies that v∗ / ∈ V,b e c a u s ei fVv∗ = V  
v∗, then either
every consumer with valuation v∗ purchases at the same time under σ and σ  or v∗ is
nongeneric with respect to (p)t.
If Vv∗ = V  
v∗ = 0, then there is no time t at which v∗ >p t and a consumer with val-
uation v∗ is able to purchase under either σ or σ . This implies that there is no time t
at which v ≥ pt and a consumer with valuation v is able to purchase under either σ or
σ ,f o ra n yv ∈ V,b e c a u s ev<v ∗ for all v ∈ V and a consumer with a lower valuation is
able to purchase at a weakly smaller set of times. Therefore, a consumer with valua-
tion v never purchases under either σ or σ ,f o ra l lv ∈ V, which implies that V is empty,
a contradiction.
If Vv∗ = V  
v∗ > 0,t h e nf o ra n yη ∈ (0 Vv∗) there exist at most ﬁnitely many times t
such that there exists v ∈[ v v] such that δt(v − pt) ≥ Vv∗ − η and qt > ˜ Qt,w h e r e ˜ Qt is
the measure of consumers who purchase at time t under σ and have valuations greater
than v∗ (as pt ≥ 0 for all t); call the set of such times T .L e t εt ≡ qt − ˜ Qt and let
ε ≡ min{εt :t ∈ T }/2 > 0. Since every consumer with generic valuation greater than v∗
purchases at the same time under σ and σ , by deﬁnition of V, and the set of consumers
with nongeneric valuations is of measure 0,b yLemma 1, the measure of consumers
with valuations greater than v∗ − ε w h op u r c h a s ea ta n yt under σ  is less than ˜ Qt + ε.
By deﬁnition of ε, this implies that the measure of consumers with valuations greater
than v∗ − ε who purchase at any t ∈ T under σ  is less than qt. So any consumer with
valuation v>v ∗ − ε can purchase at any time t with δt(v − pt) ≥ Vv∗ − η under σ  at
which she can purchase under σ. By the same argument, there exists ε  > 0 such that a
consumer with valuation v>v ∗ −ε  can purchase at any time t with δt(v−pt) ≥ Vv∗ −η
under σ at which she can purchase under σ . Therefore, letting ε   ≡ min{ε ε },w es e e
that a consumer with valuation v>v ∗ − ε   can purchase at the same set of times t with
δt(v − pt) ≥ Vv∗ − η under σ and σ . Furthermore, a consumer with valuation close
enough to v∗ can purchase at any time at which a consumer with valuation v∗ can pur-
chase (by our speciﬁcation of rationing), so there exists ε∗ such that a consumer with
valuation v>v ∗ − ε∗ receives a payoff of at least Vv∗ − η under both σ and σ . Finally,
by deﬁnition of v∗,t h e r ee x i s t sv ∈ V such that v>v ∗ − min{ε   ε∗}.A c o n s u m e r w i t h
valuation v r e c e i v e sap a y o f fo fa tl e a s tVv∗ − η under both σ and σ , which implies that
he purchases at a time t with δt(v − pt) ≥ Vv∗ − η under both σ and σ .T h es e to fs u c h
timesatwhichtheconsumercanpurchaseisthesameunderσ andσ . Sincev isgeneric510 Alexander Wolitzky Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
with respect to (p)t, the consumer has a strict preference ordering over purchase times,
which implies that he purchases at the same time under σ and σ , which contradicts the
assumption that v ∈ V.  
ProofofLemma5. ConsidertheproblemofmaximizingQt overprice–rationingpaths
(p  q )t in an ε ball about (p q)t.A sε → 0, the measure of consumers who have differ-
ent preference orderings over purchase times (i.e., over the {δt(v − pt)}t)u n d e r(p  q )t
and (p q)t converges to 0. Furthermore, the maximum difference between Qτ and a
Q 
τ corresponding to (p q )t in an ε ball about (p q)t (holding (p)t ﬁ x e d )i sn om o r e
than
∞
t=0max{ε Qt}, the maximum measure of consumers whose purchasing times
can be affected by decreasing qt by ε for all t and holding other consumers’ purchas-
ing times ﬁxed; this follows because if rationing prevents measure μ consumers from
purchasing at some time t, each of these consumers cannot alter his play in a way that
leads more than one total consumer to purchase at time τ (i.e., he can purchase at
time τ himself or he can displace one other consumer through rationing at some other
time).31 Thus, the maximum variation in Qt over an ε ball about (p q)t converges to
limε→0
∞
t=0max{ε Qt} as ε → 0, so the following technical lemma completes the proof.
Lemma 7. Given any quantity path (Q)t, limε→0
∞
t=0max{ε Qt}=0.





















ε#{t :Qt >ε } 
Let Nε ≡ #{t :Qt >ε } to simplify notation. Assume, toward a contradiction, that the
lemma is false, i.e., that there exists δ>0 such that for all ε>0 there exists ε<ε sat-
isfying εNε >δ .F i x s u c h a δ>0 and let ε0 > 0 satisfy ε0N0 >δ .N o w f o r a l l n ≥ 1,
let εn = εn−1/2n and let εn be a strictly positive number strictly less than εn satisfying
εnNεn >δ. Note that εn/εn−1 < 1/2n.
Observe that, for any n, Nεn < 1/εn, for otherwise the total quantity of sales made in
the Nεn periods in which Qt >ε n would exceed 1. Since Nεn < 1/εn and εn+1Nεn+1 >δ ,
we have that Nεn+1 − Nεn >δ / ε n+1 − 1/εn.N o wNεn+1 − Nεn is the number of periods in




















31We omit the measure-theoretic details of this argument, which are similar to those in the proof of
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This contradicts the assumption that the population of consumers is of measure 1.  
ProofofProposition4. Supposethatrationingoccursattimet∗ alongafull-delivery
PBE path (p q)t. We show that (p q)t cannot be a best full-delivery PBE path.
First, consider the path (p  q )t given by p 
t = pt for all t and q 
t = Qt for all t,w h e r e
(Q)t is the unique (by Lemma 4) quantity path corresponding to (p q)t.A l lc o n s u m e r s
are best-responding if they purchase at the same time under (p  q )t as they did un-
der (p q)t,a n db yLemma 3, this purchasing schedule is unique up to the measure-
zero set of consumers who are indifferent between purchasing at different times, so the
seller’s proﬁt is the same in any full-delivery PBE corresponding to (p  q )t and in any
full-delivery PBE corresponding to (p q)t. Furthermore, Dt∗((p  q )t)>q  
t∗. Since F ad-
mitsastrictlypositivedensity,thereisasmallenoughstrictincreasein pt∗,  p,suchthat
demand at t∗ still exceeds qt∗ when price at t∗ is increased by  p. So consider the path
(p∗ q∗)t given by p∗
t∗ = pt∗ +  p, p∗
t = pt for all t  = t∗,a n dq∗
t = Qt for all t.W e c l a i m
that Q∗
t = Qt for all t, which then implies that proﬁt is higher under (p∗ q∗)t than under
(p  q )t (and therefore (p q)t), since Qt∗ > 0 (by the deﬁnition of rationing occurring at
t∗).
Since q∗
t = Qt for all t,w eh a v eQ∗
t ≤ Qt for all t, so since Q∗
t∗ = Qt∗ by deﬁni-





t =t∗ Qt. Suppose, toward a contra-
diction, that

t =t∗ Qt −

t =t∗ Q∗
t ≡ μ>0.F o r a n y τ  = t∗,i fQτ − Q∗
τ ≡ μτ > 0,t h e n
Dτ((p∗ q∗)t) = q∗
τ − μτ. Since the price at τ i st h es a m eu n d e r(p∗ q∗)t and (p q)t,t h i s
is possible only if there are measure μτ consumers who demanded the good at τ un-
der (p q)t and have higher PBE payoffs under (p∗ q∗)t. Since prices are weakly higher
in each period under (p∗ q∗)t, this implies that at least μτ consumers who purchase
at τ under (p q)t must purchase at times under (p∗ q∗)t at which they could not pur-
chase under (p q)t. This argument applies to all τ such that μτ > 0,s oa tl e a s tμ =

t μt
consumers purchase at times under (p∗ q∗)t at which they could not purchase under
(p q)t, and they receive higher payoffs under (p∗ q∗)t.L e tD be the set of consumers
w h op u r c h a s ea tt i m e su n d e r(p∗ q∗)t at which they could not purchase under (p q)t
and receive higher payoffs under (p∗ q∗)t. Now measure μ of consumers can purchase
at times under (p∗ q∗)t at which none of them can purchase under (p q)t only if there
exists a measure-preserving injection ψ:D →[ v v] (mapping consumers who do better
under (p∗ q∗)t to consumers they displace) from these consumers to a another set of
consumers of mass μ satisfying the following conditions.
(i) For all v ∈ D, ψ(v) > v.
(ii) If a consumer with generic (with respect to (p∗)t) valuation v purchases at time
t under (p∗ q∗)t, then every consumer with valuation ψ(v) purchases at time
t under (p q)t, and (since ψ is measure-preserving) for every t the measure of
consumers in the preimage who purchase at time t under (p∗ q∗)t equals the
measure of consumers in the image who purchase at time t under (p q)t.
(iii) A consumer in the image of ψ who purchases at time t under (p q)t purchases at
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Notethateachoftheconsumersintheimageofψretains,under(p∗ q∗)t,theoption
of purchasing at the same time at which he purchased under (p q)t, because his valua-
tionishigherthanthatofthecorrespondingconsumerinthepreimage,sosincehedoes
not do so, it must be either that he purchases at a time t  at which he could not purchase
under (p∗ q∗)t and receives a higher payoff under (p∗ q∗)t or that t = t∗, in which case
purchasing at t has become less attractive. That is, if a consumer is in the image of ψ,
then either he is also in D (the preimage of ψ) or he purchases at t∗ under (p q)t but not
under (p∗ q∗)t. Iterating the procedure of constructing such a measure-preserving in-
jection from consumers who purchase at different times under (p∗ q∗)t and (p q),a n d
receive higher payoffs under (p∗ q∗)t to the consumers they displace implies that there
are μ consumers who did not purchase at t∗ under (p q)t who do purchase at t∗ under
(p∗ q∗)t, that all of them receive higher payoffs under (p∗ q∗)t than under (p q)t,a n d
that a measure-preserving bijection satisfying conditions (i)–(iii) exists between the set
of consumers who receive a higher payoff under (p∗ q∗)t than under (p q)t and the set
ofconsumerswhopurchaseatt∗ under(p q)t whodonotpurchaseatt∗ under(p∗ q∗)t.
By the preceding paragraph, the measure of consumers who purchase at t∗ under
(p q)t who do not purchase at t∗ under (p∗ q∗)t is at least μ. Since all consumers
who purchase at t∗ under (p∗ q∗)t but not under (p q)t receive a higher payoff under
(p∗ q∗)t, it follows that every consumer who purchases at t∗ under (p q)t has a higher
valuation than any of these consumers, and, therefore, has a higher valuation than any
consumer who receives a higher payoff under (p∗ q∗)t than under (p q)t. Therefore,
everyconsumerwhopurchasesat t∗ under (p q)t butnotunder (p∗ q∗)t preferstopur-
chase at any τ satisfying μτ > 0 to never purchasing. Furthermore, suppose that mass ε
of such consumers, with valuations with inﬁmum v,p u r c h a s ea tt i m eˆ τ satisfying μˆ τ = 0
under (p∗ q∗)t. Then there must exist mass ε of consumers each with valuation strictly
lessthanv whopurchaseat ˆ τ under(p q)t butnotunder(p∗ q∗)t.C o n s i d e rs u c hac o n -
sumer with valuation v  <v,ﬁ xa n yτ satisfying μτ > 0, and suppose toward a contradic-
tion that v  <p τ.W eh a v et h a tv>p τ, a consumer with valuation v prefers purchasing
at time ˆ τ and price pˆ τ to purchasing at time τ and price pτ (by revealed preference at
(p∗ q∗)t, since there is no rationing at τ under (p∗ q∗)t), and a consumer with valua-
tion v  also prefers purchasing at time ˆ τ and price pˆ τ to purchasing at time τ and price
pτ (sincev  >pˆ τ byrevealedpreferenceat(p q)t andv  <p τ byassumption). Nowthere
also exists a consumer who purchases at time τ and price pτ under (p q)t and obtains
a higher payoff under (p∗ q∗)t, since μτ > 0. Such a consumer must have valuation
v   ∈[ pτ v),s ov   >v  , which implies that such a consumer has the option of purchas-
ing at ˆ τ under (p q)t. Therefore, such a consumer must prefer purchasing at time τ and
price pτ topurchasingattime ˆ τ andprice pˆ τ. Thus,theassumptionthatv  <p τ ≤ v   <v
yields a violation of single crossing. Therefore, each of the μ consumers who purchases
at t∗ under (p q)t but not under (p∗ q∗)t either purchases at a τ such that μτ > 0 un-
der (p∗ q∗)t or else displaces another consumer who prefers to purchase at any such τ
to never purchasing. So the measure of consumers who purchase at some (ﬁnite) time
under (p∗ q∗)t must weakly exceed the measure of consumers who purchase at some
time under (p q)t. Since Q∗





t =t∗ Qt, completing
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It remains only to check that there exists a full-delivery PBE with price–rationing
path (p∗ q∗)t. This follows from the fact that there exists a full-delivery PBE with price–
rationing path (p q)t, because, since Q∗
t = Qt for all t and p∗
t ≥ pt for all t, the seller’s
gain from nondelivery is the same in every period under (p∗ q∗)t as under (p q)t and
her gain from delivery is weakly higher in every period under (p∗ q∗)t in a strategy pro-
ﬁle in which consumers expect the seller to never deliver in the future if she does not
deliver in the current period.  
Proof of Corollary 1. Suppose that (p∗ q∗)t is a best full-delivery PBE price–
rationingpathin  R. Considerthefollowingstrategyproﬁlein  ,whichwedenoteby σ.
1. The seller sets price path (p∗)t and xt = 1 as long as she has conformed to this
strategy in the past. Otherwise, she sets pt = v, xt = 0 for all future periods. In
particular, the seller sets xt = 0 in any period in which she has set pt  = p∗
t .
2. A consumer with valuation v who has not yet received the good at τ accepts at τ
if and only if the seller has never deviated from her prescribed strategy and τ ∈
argmaxt δt(v −p∗
t ).32
To establish that σ is a PBE, we ﬁrst observe that a consumer with valuation v re-
ceives the same payoff Vv under σ as under any full-delivery PBE with price–rationing
path (p∗ q∗)t in  R. This follows because, since no rationing occurs along (p∗ q∗)t in
 R (by Proposition 4) and the path of play does not depend on an individual consumer’s
actions, a consumer with generic valuation v facing (p∗ q∗)t in  R purchases at time τ
if and only if τ ∈ argmaxt δt(v − p∗
t ) in any full-delivery PBE. Furthermore, if valuation v
is generic with respect to (p∗)t, then the payoff of a consumer with valuation v uniquely
determines her purchase time. Therefore, (Q)t is the same under any full-delivery PBE
with price–rationing path (p∗ q∗)t in  R as under σ.
Next note that if the seller ever sets pτ  = p∗
τ, she receives zero continuation payoff.
Since this is her minmax value in  R, she cannot receive continuation payoff strictly less
than this in the continuation game from τ + 1 onward in  R under a full-delivery PBE
with price–rationing path (p∗ q∗)t. Now we have seen that (Q)t i st h es a m ei na n yf u l l -
delivery PBE with price–rationing path (p∗ q∗)t in  R as in σ, and by construction (p)t
is the same as well, so the seller’s on-path continuation payoff from τ + 1 onward must
be the same too, so in particular this continuation payoff must be nonnegative. This
implies that setting pτ  = p∗
τ on path is not a proﬁtable deviation. Similarly, the fact that
setting qt = q∗
t is optimal on path along (p∗ q∗)t implies that setting qt = q∗
t is optimal
onpath in σ, becausethecostofdeliveryand on-pathcontinuation valuesareidentical,
while the payoff of zero that results from deviating from the equilibrium path in σ is
at least as bad as the payoff from deviating in any PBE of  R. Also, the seller’s off-path
play is optimal because off-path price-setting does not affect her payoffs and off-path
delivery imposes a positive cost at no beneﬁt.
32The case where there are multiple maximizers is irrelevant, as this is occurs for a set of measure-zero
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We next check that each consumer’s play is optimal. It is again obvious that his off-
path play is optimal, as paying is costly and yields no beneﬁt when the seller sets qt = 0.
That his on-path play is optimal follows from the fact that the seller’s strategy is full
delivery. So σ is a full-delivery PBE of  .
Theaboveargumentshowsthatifaprice–quantitypath (p Q)t isabestfull-delivery
PBEprice–quantitypathin R,thenitisalsoabestfull-deliveryPBEprice–quantitypath
in  . For the converse, suppose that (p∗ Q∗)t is a full-delivery PBE price–quantity path
in  . Consider the following strategy proﬁle in  R:
1. The seller sets price path (p∗)t,a n dqt = 1 and xt = 1, as long as she has conformed
to this strategy in the past. Otherwise, she sets pt = v, qt = 1,a n dxt = 0 for all
future periods. In particular, the sellersets xt = 0 in any period in which she has set
pt  = p∗
t .
2. A consumer with valuation v who has not yet received the good at τ pays at τ
if and only if the seller has never deviated from her prescribed strategy and τ ∈
argmaxt δt(v −p∗
t ).
ItiseasytocheckthatthisisaPBEin  R. Furthermore,sincenootherplayerscondi-
tion play on an individual consumer’s actions, a consumer with generic valuation v pur-
chases at time τ under this strategy proﬁle if and only if a consumer with this valuation
purchases at τ in any full-delivery PBE in   with price–quantity path (p∗ Q∗)t.T h i si m -
plies that the mass of consumers who purchase at each period under this proﬁle is the
same as the mass of consumers who purchase at each period in any full-delivery PBE
in   with price–quantity path (p∗ Q∗)t, which then implies that the seller’s proﬁt under
this strategy proﬁle is the same as under any full-delivery PBE in   with price–quantity
path (p∗ Q∗)t. This completes the proof.  
Appendix B: Non-full-delivery equilibria
This appendix considers non-full-delivery PBE of the relational contracting model of
Section 5. We conjecture that optimal PBE of   are not fully-delivery PBE, although the
difference in payoff between an optimal PBE and a best full-delivery PBE must converge
to 0 as δ converges to 1, as argued in the text. This is because setting x<1 allows the
seller to sell to some lower-valuation consumers before higher-valuation consumers.
This may be useful for the seller, as selling to low-valuation consumers before high-
valuation consumers may be a way to increase continuation payoffs without increasing
quantity sold today, allowing the seller to sell more quickly.
While a complete analysis of optimal (non-full-delivery) PBE is outside the scope of
this paper, we show here that analogues of parts (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 1 for non-full-
delivery PBE can be established without reference to the model with rationing. We view
theseresultsascomplementarytothoseinthetext, becausefull-deliveryPBEareofpar-
ticular interest for reasons discussed in the text. The results in this appendix do not es-
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proﬁts; we do not know how to establish this result without using the connection to the
model with rationing developed in Section 5.
Intuitively, we can prove analogues of parts (iii) and (iv) of Theorem 1 directly for
non-full-delivery PBE because we can use nondelivery to substitute for rationing. That
is, instead of using rationing to ensure that only fraction γ of those consumers who de-
mand the good at price pt at time t are allowed to purchase at t, the seller can charge
γpt to each of these consumers in exchange for delivering the good to each of them with
probability γ. Withthisideainhand,theproofofparts(iii)and(iv)ofTheorem1follows
easily from the proof of Proposition 6 in Section 6.
Proposition 11. There exists a strategy proﬁle in   that is a non-full-delivery PBE for
high enough δ under which the seller’s payoff converges to her static monopoly payoff as
δ → 1.
Proof. Consider the following strategy proﬁle:
1. The seller sets pt = γpm and xt = γ for all t and for γ an arbitrary positive constant
less than 1, as long as she has conformed to this strategy in the past. Otherwise,
she sets pt = v and xt = 0 for all future periods, and, in particular, sets xt = 0 in any
period in which she has set pt  = γpm.
2. A consumer with valuation v who has not yet received the good pays if and only if
v ≥ pm, and the seller has never deviated from her prescribed strategy.
At any period t along the equilibrium path, a consumer with valuation v<p m has
continuation value 0, while a consumer with valuation v ≥ pm who has not yet received
the good has continuation value (δγ/(1−δ(1−γ)))(v − pm)<( γ / ( 1−δ(1−γ))) ×
(v − pm), so every consumer’s play is optimal by the one-shot deviation principle. It
is clear that the seller’s off-path play and on-path price setting are optimal. It remains
only to check that the seller has an incentive to deliver the good along the equilibrium
path. This condition is
∞ 
τ=1
δτ((1−γ)t+τpt+τ −γ(1−γ)t+τc)≥ γ(1−γ)tc for all t ≥ 0 
For any t, this can be rewritten as inequality (1). Now if δ>c / p m, then there ex-
ists a positive γ that satisﬁes (1). The above strategy proﬁle then yields proﬁt (γ/(1 −
δ(1−γ)))D(pm)(pm−c)fortheseller,whichconvergestoD(pm)(pm−c)asδconverges
to 1.  
For the analogue of part (iv) of Theorem 1 for non-full-delivery PBE, we argue as in
the discussion following Proposition 6. Consider the strategy proﬁle where the seller
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B yt h es a m ea r g u m e n tt h a tl e dt o( 1), γ∗(p) is the greatest probability of receiving the
good that the seller can credibly offer at price γ∗(p)p in a PBE with ﬁxed price and de-
livery probability. The best PBE proﬁt for the seller with a constant price path at γp and













Therefore, if the seller sets pt = γpm(c/δ) and xt = γ∗(pm(c/δ)) = (δpm(c/δ) − c)/
(δpm(c/δ)) for all t on the equilibrium path, and off-path play is given as in the strategy
proﬁle in the proof of Proposition 11, the seller’s proﬁt is equal to the static monopoly
proﬁt when cost equals c/δ. Finally, the seller can achieve a strictly higher payoff than
this by slightly raising price and delivery probability early on while keeping quantity de-
liveredconstantineveryperiod,inanalogywiththediscussionprecedingProposition7.
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